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Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts
Jenny Roberts*
Most individuals accused in our nation’s criminal courts are not charged
with murder, rape, drug sales, or even less serious felonies. The vast
majority of charges are in the lower courts, for misdemeanors such as
marijuana possession, driving with a license suspension for failure to pay
tickets, assault, disorderly conduct, or public intoxication. Misdemeanor
adjudications have exploded in recent years, with one recent study
estimating that the volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide has risen
from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006. At the same
time, violent crime and the number of felony cases across the country have
decreased markedly.
A common misperception is that misdemeanor charges might lead to a
night in jail and the punishment of going through the process — often
requiring a number of court appearances — culminating in dismissal,
deferred adjudication, or a quick guilty plea with community service, a
fine, or perhaps some small amount of jail time. Yet the consequences of
even the most “minor” misdemeanor conviction can be far reaching, and
include deportation, sex offender registration, and loss of public housing
and student loans. In addition, criminal records are now widely available
electronically and employers, landlords, and others log on to check them.
These “collateral consequences” of a misdemeanor conviction are often
more dire than any direct criminal penalty.
What often stands between an individual and an avoidable misdemeanor
conviction, with its harsh effects, is a good lawyer. Yet a profound crisis
exists in the lower courts, brought about by a widespread lack of zealous
representation for indigent people charged with misdemeanors. Many
individuals charged with low-level crimes receive representation from
defense attorneys with overwhelming caseloads, in a criminal justice
system singularly focused on rapid finality in the large numbers of
docketed cases. Despite this urgent situation, the body of scholarship on
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the right to effective representation and the indigent defense crisis has
largely ignored misdemeanors. This Article describes how ineffective
assistance jurisprudence is undeveloped for misdemeanors and how
published professional standards for defense advocacy have failed to
address misdemeanors. There is almost no guidance about proper norms
for this distinct category of cases. This Article calls for responses to the
misdemeanor representation crisis from the three groups situated to make
a difference in this area based on their particular institutional
competencies: the judiciary, the defender community, and professional
organizations that draft standards for practice. Without proper
administration, including effective defense representation, the current
approach to mass misdemeanor processing and prosecution significantly
impedes substantive justice for the individual, public perception of justice,
and public safety.
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INTRODUCTION
It is time to end the wasteful and harmful practices that have
turned our misdemeanor courts into mindless conviction mills.
— Former Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Gerald Kogan1
In Detroit, Michigan, the Misdemeanor Defender Professional
Corporation has a flat-fee contract with the City of Detroit to handle
between 12,000 and 14,000 cases each year.2 The five part-time
*
Copyright © 2011 Jenny Roberts. Associate Professor, American University,
Washington College of Law. Many thanks to Gabriel “Jack” Chin, Robert Dinerstein,
Cara Drinan, Roger Fairfax, Babe Howell, Lewis Grossman, Mary Holland, Cynthia
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William & Mary School of Law Faculty Colloquium. For research assistance, thanks
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1
ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREEMINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 8 (2011)
[hereinafter THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE].
2
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, “A RACE TO THE BOTTOM,” EVALUATION OF
THE TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN MICHIGAN 23 (2008) [hereinafter RACE
TO THE BOTTOM].

280

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:277

Corporation attorneys must carry between 2,400 and 2,800
misdemeanors a year, which is more than 500 percent greater than the
nationally recognized caseload recommendation of 300–400
misdemeanors per year for full-time defenders.3 This means that
Corporation attorneys will spend an average of thirty-two minutes, or
about $51 of legal services, on each client’s case.4 Thirty minutes
south, in Woodhaven, Michigan, a similar situation occurs. There, a
person charged with a misdemeanor who is entitled to courtappointed counsel will be represented at a pretrial conference by
“house counsel” who represents every indigent defendant in court that
day.5 Those facing misdemeanor charges cannot meet their attorney
until the day of court, “which could be anywhere from one to three
weeks after arraignment.”6 The court administrator in Woodhaven
“estimated that, in an average year, there would be one motion filed by
house counsel and maybe two jury trials involving an indigent
defendant.”7
These stories of assembly-line representation in the lower criminal
courts have received little attention. Instead, scholars, practitioners,
and the press have highlighted inadequate representation cases such as
one where a court deemed “effective” the performance of a sleeping
lawyer in a death penalty case.8 A series of DNA exonerations of
innocent men and women in high-profile cases have also “reveal[ed] a
trail of sleeping, drunk, incompetent and overburdened defense
attorneys.”9 These shocking examples and others deserve continuing
criticism; the stakes were high, and the representation was egregious.
Contrary to popular belief, however, the vast majority of criminal
cases in the United States are not felonies. They are misdemeanors:
“minor” dramas played out in much higher numbers every day in

3

Id.; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text (describing nationally
recommended caseload standards).
4
RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 23.
5
Id. at 27.
6
Id. (noting that “the court does not give out house counsel phone numbers
until the day of court”).
7
Id.
8
See McFarland v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Jeffrey
L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
460-63 (1996); Bob Herbert, In America; The Death Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000,
at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/02/opinion/in-america-thedeath-factory.html?scp=2&sq=sleeping%20lawyer%20death%20penalty&st=cse.
9
Bad Lawyering, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited July 11, 2011).
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lower courts across the country.10 A 2008 analysis of eleven state
courts revealed that misdemeanors comprised 79% of the total
caseload in those courts.11 In addition to comprising the majority of
criminal cases, misdemeanors are also on the rise. One recent study
estimated that the volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide has risen
from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006.12 This
change has taken place across diverse jurisdictions. In New York State,
misdemeanor arrests rose from 363,634 in 2001 to 423,947 in 2010.13
The public defender in Lancaster County, Nebraska experienced a
56% increase in the number of new misdemeanor cases between 2003
and 2007.14 In Florida, almost “a half million people, or approximately
10

See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010,
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/NewYorkState.pdf
[hereinafter NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010] (listing statistics for “adult
arrests” for New York States in 2010 as 584,558 total, of which 423,947 were
misdemeanors and 160,611 were felonies).
11
ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
d_research/csp/2008_files/EWSC-2008-Online%20Version%20v2.pdf; see also NEW YORK
STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001-2010, supra note 10 (noting almost 600,000 arrests in 2010,
with felonies comprising just over 160,000 of that total); Steve W. Perry, Prosecutors in
State Courts, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL., at 6 (Ser. No. NCJ
213799, 2006) (“In 2005 State court prosecutors reported closing over 2.4 million felony
cases
and
nearly
7.5
million
misdemeanor
cases.”),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. The actual difference between
prosecuted misdemeanors and felonies is even greater, as only 95% of all state
prosecutors’ offices reported handling misdemeanor cases. Id. at 4 tbl.5. County
attorneys or perhaps police officers presumably prosecuted misdemeanors in the
remaining five percent of jurisdictions, or the court handled the disposition without any
prosecutorial involvement.
12
See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASSOC.
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF
AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE] (citing National Center for State Courts, 2007 Criminal Caseloads
Report finding that in data gathered in 12 states in 2006, there was a “median
misdemeanor rate of 3,544 per 100,000” people).
13
See NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010, supra note 10 (listing numbers
demonstrating that misdemeanor arrests climbed substantially each year from 2000 to
2009, with the exception of 2004); see also JUSTIN BARRY & LISA LINDSAY, OFFICE
DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 26-27 (2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/
AnnualReport2009.pdf.
14
ELIZABETH NEELEY, LANCASTER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT
JULY 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://ppc.unl.edu/userfiles/file/Documents/
projects/Public%20Defender/Public%20Defender%20Workload%20Assessment.pdf.
The corresponding felony picture is quite different. Between 2000 and 2009, the
violent crime rate in the United States fell by 39%. Both violent and property crime
rates in 2009 were at their lowest recorded levels since 1973. Jennifer L. Truman &
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3% of the state’s adults, pass through [the] misdemeanor courts each
year.”15 These numbers reflect a recent explosion of misdemeanor
adjudications flooding trial courts around the country. Although full
exploration of the causes of rising misdemeanor volume are beyond
the scope of this Article, the adoption of zero-tolerance policing and
broken windows theory — which claim that policing minor quality-oflife offenses helps control violent crime — are largely responsible for
the trend in many jurisdictions.16
The high-volume misdemeanor system is clearly in crisis.
Misdemeanor defenders handle caseloads far above nationally
recommended standards,17 yet have few resources to investigate and
perform the core tasks for their clients’ cases.18 They practice in
overcrowded courts where defendants are pressured to enter quick
guilty pleas without adequate time to consult with the attorney they
may have just met.19 Their potential clients often face pressure to
waive the right to counsel in order to enter a guilty plea.20

Michael R. Rand, Criminal Victimization, 2009, in U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS. BULL. at 2-3, (Ser. No. NCJ 231327, 2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf; cf. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005: PERCENT CHANGE IN VOLUME AND
RATE PER 100,000 INHABITANTS FOR 2 YEARS, 5 YEARS, 10 YEARS (2009), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01a.html (showing how, between 2000
and 2009, the violent crime rate fell 15.2% per 100,000 inhabitants). Except for
burglary, violent crime fell in every category, including murder, rape, and aggravated
assault. It also fell 31.5% for motor vehicle theft during that ten-year period. Id. In
New York, for example, violent felony arrests dropped from more than 51,000 in 2001
to 44,000 in 2010. NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001-2010, supra note 10 (listing
overall felony total as dropping from 169,942 in 2001 to 160,611 in 2010).
15
See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 9 app. C.
16
See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29 (introducing the “broken windows” theory); see also Peter A. Barta,
Note, Giuliani, Broken Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
165, 168–69 (1999) (summarizing Mayor Giuliani’s “zero-tolerance policing”
approach and its effects on New York City’s homeless population); cf. BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6-7
(2001) (scrutinizing the evidence and policy behind the “broken windows” theory).
17
See infra Part I.A.
18
See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10-11, 19 (2004),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/
fullreport.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE,
supra note 12, at 38.
19
See infra Part I.D (discussing coercive aspects of plea bargaining in the lower
courts).
20
See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing waiver of the right to counsel).
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The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies
to many misdemeanor cases and implicates many of these issues of
high workloads, resource deprivation, and substantive and procedural
justice.21 There are also ethical rules, state laws, and professional
guidelines relevant to criminal defense representation. Yet, the crisis in
effective misdemeanor representation confronts a blank slate of
standards specific to misdemeanor practice. The Supreme Court has
never applied Strickland v. Washington’s two-pronged ineffective
assistance of counsel test in the misdemeanor context.22 Although
some lower court decisions have done so, these cases do not tackle the
difficult question of what differences there are, if any, between
effective representation in felony and misdemeanor cases.23
Professional standards, an important source for norms of effective
assistance both as a constitutional and practical matter, also do not
consider the specific issues and problems relating to misdemeanor
advocacy.24 In short, there are no standards against which to judge the
critical failures of representation in the lower criminal courts.25
Careful analysis of the current state of misdemeanor representation
in the United States is inadequately developed, and the subject merits
much more than the scant attention it now receives both in criminal
justice literature and in practice.26 Thus, at a time when some
21

See infra Part II.A (explaining how the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies in any case where the defendant is sentenced to actual or suspended
incarceration, and how many states offer more generous levels of misdemeanor
representation, including states that confer the right to counsel for all misdemeanors
regardless of the sentence). The vast majority of individuals charged with
misdemeanors, and who have a right to counsel, qualify for state-appointed counsel.
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006) (“Poor people account for more
than eighty percent of individuals prosecuted.”).
22
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (noting that defendant,
to win claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, must demonstrate (1) that defense
counsel’s representation was deficient as judged by prevailing professional norms, and
(2) that this deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant). For an insightful and
comprehensive examination of the Court’s jurisprudential journey towards the twoprong ineffective assistance test, see Donald A. Dripps, Effective Assistance of Counsel:
The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 269-78
(1997); see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing lack of Supreme Court cases on
misdemeanor ineffective assistance).
23
See also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
24
See infra Part II.B.2.
25
See infra Part I.
26
Although the literature has largely failed to examine misdemeanors and other
minor adjudications separately, there are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Erica J.
Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 461
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commentators have called for a greater focus on the felony
representation crisis at the expense of misdemeanor representation,27
this Article recognizes a utilitarian argument for more attention to
low-level cases, which affect so many individuals and communities
and have serious hidden consequences.28 As one report noted,
“[E]xperts have observed innumerable times that public defender
offices across the country are underfunded. What is essentially
unreported is how this underfunding disparately impacts those
accused of misdemeanors.”29
The crisis in misdemeanor representation and the lack of specific
standards for this large category of cases raises important questions for
courts, professional organizations, and defender offices. Should there
be separate standards for misdemeanor representation? If felony
ineffective assistance jurisprudence and existing professional
(2007); John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1222
(1994) (focusing on a “practical definition of the Sixth Amendment in the lower
courts”). With respect to the realities of the lower criminal courts, see Michael Pinard,
Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry Into
Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1069-70 & n.9 (2004); Ian
Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1157, 1160-62 (2004); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Court and
the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 316 (2005) (discussing New York City).
Recent commentary on broken windows theory, although focused on the policing
aspects of minor charges, is also relevant here. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 16, at 67 (questioning whether broken windows is an effective strategy). With respect to
misdemeanors more generally, “there is a startling dearth of data on misdemeanor
case processing.” Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 89
(2007) (noting how New York City is “something of an exception” to this general
observation).
27
See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004) (suggesting default rules by
which indigent defense providers should ration scarce resources, including “a harmreduction principle that gives a qualified preference to suspects facing greater
potential punishments”); Hashimoto, supra note 26, at 461 (arguing that states should
free up limited defender resources by “significantly curtailing the appointment of
counsel in low-level misdemeanor cases,” but ignoring the collateral consequences of
misdemeanor convictions). For a robust debate over the need for triage in criminal
defense work, compare Mitchell, supra note 26, at 1222 (1994) (focusing on a
“practical definition of the Sixth Amendment in the lower courts” and urging
recognition of the need for triage in decision-making process about how to distribute
defender resources), with Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public
Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911(2005) (rejecting Mitchell’s call for triage and redefinition of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). See also John B. Mitchell, In
(Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925
(2005) (responding to Freedman).
28
See infra Part I.B.
29
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 26.
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standards apply to misdemeanors, where should misdemeanor lawyers
look for guidance about misdemeanor-specific issues such as higher
caseloads, fewer resources, and plea offers and guilty pleas at the first
court appearance? Given the many structural obstacles to
development of a jurisprudence of ineffective misdemeanor
lawyering,30 how might courts shape ineffective assistance law to
address misdemeanor-specific situations? Should professional
organizations rely on commentary or rather black-letter misdemeanorspecific standards in order to guide misdemeanor representation?
What often stands between an individual and an unnecessary
misdemeanor conviction is a good lawyer. The quality of
representation that an individual gets in a misdemeanor case is
significant on many levels, including substantive justice for that
individual, public perception of justice, and public safety. First, people
sometimes go to jail for misdemeanor convictions. Sentences may be
short compared to those for serious felony charges, but six months in
jail or several years of probation, often with monthly fees,31 is
substantial for the individual and his family.32 An effective lawyer will
advance sentencing arguments that help avoid unnecessary
incarceration in appropriate cases, whereas the absence of such
advocacy can lead to unjust sentences. In addition, the potential for
wrongful convictions and the troubling phenomenon of innocent
people pleading guilty is great in low-level cases.33 Exonerations in
high-profile and high-stakes cases are well documented and
publicized,34 and inadequate representation is one of the core causes of
wrongful convictions.35 Although there is no empirical study of such
30

See infra Part III.B.1.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-225 (West 2011) (“Any person under state
probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute not more than seventyfive dollars ($75) per month as determined by the board of correction.”).
32
See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (describing statutes in which
misdemeanors in various jurisdictions can carry up to two, four, or even ten years in
jail). This observation is also based on my experience in Syracuse, New York, where
failure to complete drug treatment court for misdemeanor possession regularly
resulted in nine- to twelve-month sentences.
33
See infra Part I.D (discussing coercion and plea bargaining in the misdemeanor
context).
34
See, e.g., Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (“There have been
280 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States history. These stories are
becoming more familiar as more innocent people gain their freedom through
postconviction testing.”).
35
See EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES 1
31
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wrongful convictions in the lower courts, the conviction of the
innocent through trial or guilty plea is surely not limited to capital
cases and serious felonies.36 Unfortunately, as one report noted,
“There is no national Innocence Project for the hundreds of thousands
of misdemeanor cases that lack DNA evidence.”37
Second, the relationship between a person charged with a
misdemeanor and defense counsel is a meaningful part of the overall
experience that person has with the criminal justice system.38
Procedural justice matters. Inadequate assistance of counsel in
criminal cases affects both the individual’s and the public’s perception
of the criminal justice system’s legitimacy, which may undermine
future willingness to obey the law.39 Third, recent research has
revealed that saddling large numbers of individuals with permanent
criminal records significantly impedes access to employment. This
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence_Project_IAC_
Report.pdf.
36
See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (“It is fair
to say that the proven cases of actual innocence are just the tip of the innocence
iceberg, so to speak.”).
37
RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15.
38
See Am. Council of Chief Defenders, Statement on Caseloads and Workloads at 23,
available
at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/
EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCASELOADSTATEMENTsept6.pdf
[hereinafter
Statement on Caseloads and Workloads] (“Excessive public defender caseloads and
workloads [that] threaten the ability of even the most dedicated lawyers to provide
effective representation to their clients . . . can . . . lead to the public’s loss of
confidence in the ability of our courts to provide equal justice.”); see also JUSTICE
POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 23
(2011) [hereinafter SYSTEM OVERLOAD].
39
See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 175 (2002) (“We find that
people are responsive to two social aspects of their experience with legal authorities
— their feelings about the procedural justice of their experience and their trust in the
motives of those authorities.”); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1-2 (1988). As Roscoe Pound noted more than 80
years ago:
It is in [the handling of petty prosecutions] that the administration of
criminal justice touches immediately the greatest number of people. . . . The
bad physical surroundings, the confusion, the want of decorum, the
undignified offhand disposition of cases at high speed, the frequent
suggestion of something working behind the scenes, which characterize the
petty criminal court in almost all of our cities, create in the minds of
observers a general suspicion of the whole process of law enforcement
which, no matter how unfounded, gravely prejudices the law.
MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1979) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 190191 (1930)).
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leads to more crime among those individuals, thus undermining
public safety.40 Some understanding of this link has even begun to
filter into the public dialogue about crime and public safety.41
Two ways in which the quality of misdemeanor representation
matters more today than ever before merit particular attention: the
proliferation of criminal records and the related phenomenon of an
explosion in collateral consequences for minor criminal convictions.
Recent technological advances allow easy access to individuals’
criminal records.42 In some states, even cases that end in a dismissal
remain publicly available and may require the individual to
affirmatively file, and sometimes pay, for expungement.43 This is an
enormous change from only several years ago, when researching a
person’s criminal record often required a trip to the local courthouse
or multiple courthouses.44 The result is that employers and landlords
can now quickly search criminal records, so that even when there is
no legal barrier to housing or employment for the individual, there is
an effective bar.45 One commentator has aptly described “the stigma of
40
See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO
PUBLIC SAFETY 56 (May 2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID
=11415 (“[T]he safety of our communities and citizens is jeopardized when
[convicted persons] . . . revert to a life of crime” because their permanent criminal
records make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to acquire employment, housing,
and other necessities.”); Megan C. Kurlychek & Robert Brame, Scarlet Letters and
Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 483, 486, 490 (2006) (concluding that individuals with permanent criminal
records are relatively more likely to commit future crimes).
41
See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, When ‘Help Wanted’ Comes With a Catch, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/jobs/17convicts.html?_r=2&scp=
1&sq=conviction&st=nyt (describing hiring hurdles that those with criminal records
must overcome, and noting several proposals to address these obstacles). Certainly
much of the public and political concern is driven by fiscal reality. See Adam Liptak,
Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1.
42
See generally James B. Jacobs, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177 (2007–2008) (“This Article
documents how criminal history records are expanding in scope and how their
dissemination is proliferating.”).
43
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(a) (West 2011) (requiring that
person petition for expungement of a nolle prosequi); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §7-202 (West 2011) (noting “a $30 filing fee for docketing a petition for
expungement of records in a criminal case, unless all records to be expunged relate to
a charge of which the petitioner has been acquitted.”).
44
James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 401 (2006).
45
See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC., 937, 958
(2003) (describing study where testers applied for real jobs with identical credentials
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[a] criminal record as a ‘negative curriculum vitae.’ ”46 The effect of
widely available criminal records cannot be underestimated at a time
when, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, “[o]ver 92 million
individual offenders were in the criminal history files of the State
criminal history repositories on December 31, 2008.”47
Increased access to criminal records coincides with a recent, and
exponential, growth in the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions.48 The rise in misdemeanor prosecutions and convictions
has negative effects that reach far beyond the confines of the criminal
courthouse. Individuals with misdemeanor convictions may be
automatically deportable, regardless of their work ties, time spent, and
family connections in the United States.49 They may lose or be unable
other than race and criminal record: white non-offender tester received callbacks 34%
of the time he applied; white offender received callbacks for 17% of applications; and
black offender tester callback ratio plummeted to 5%); see also Devah Pager, Bruce
Western, & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field
Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009) (rerunning earlier Pager study in New York
City, with similar results); Smart on Crime: Recommendations for the Next
Administration and Congress, THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, 13134 (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_
transition2009.pdf (recommending various executive and legislative changes to deal
with bars to employment for individuals with criminal records).
Collateral — or hidden — consequences fall into two general categories. First are
those enforced through civil statutes or regulations, such as immigration laws or
professional licensing schemes, that apply to individuals convicted of qualifying
crimes. The second category involves the more diffuse, but equally powerful and more
far-reaching, effects on families and communities when a person is involved in the
criminal system even on a relatively minor charge. These effects include a family
struggling to survive financially, where one member must pay fines and court costs, or
lose work days to numerous court appearances. See generally FEELEY, supra note 39; K.
Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Misdemeanor Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 296 (2009) (describing
how policing misdemeanors through criminal system imposes significant financial and
legitimacy costs).
46
Jacobs, supra note 44, at 420.
47
Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2008, at 4, Bureau of
Justice Statistics (Oct. 2009) (noting how “[a]n individual offender may have records
in more than one State”), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/
228661.pdf.
48
Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption,
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 770-74
(2011) (describing expanded scope and severity of collateral penalties in federal and
state law in past two decades).
49
See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; ‘This Has Got Me in Some Kind of
Whirlwind,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at A13 (describing deportation order against
Mary Anne Gehris, who was adopted and brought to United States as an infant, based
on misdemeanor conviction from her young adulthood).
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to get public housing and benefits, their driver’s license, or access to
student loans.50 If convicted of certain misdemeanor sexual offenses,
they will be required to register as a sex offender, with severe
restrictions on where they can live and work.51
Unfortunately, the vast majority of indigent individuals charged
with low-level crimes receive representation characterized by
overwhelming caseloads and by courts singularly committed to rapid
finality and churning the large numbers of docketed cases through the
system.52 Fortunately, there are a number of institutional actors that
can respond to the misdemeanor representation crisis. Legislators can
relieve the numerical and fiscal pressure on the lower courts through
selective misdemeanor decriminalization. Professional organizations
can draft specific misdemeanor representation standards or explain
why standards should be the same for felonies and misdemeanors. The
defender community can articulate misdemeanor standards and
institute practices leading to more effective representation. In
particular, the defense community could argue for resources to
provide counsel at the first appearance, to ameliorate the problem of
defendants waiving the right to counsel and guilty pleas at
arraignment. Finally, the judiciary has a central role in articulating
standards that recognize the realities of misdemeanor practice. The
judiciary must provoke state legislatures to adequately fund the
criminal justice system that the legislatures — and the executive,
through the police power — have chosen to populate with a wide
variety of broadly enforced misdemeanor crimes.
Part I of this Article provides the definition of a misdemeanor and
then sets out important differences and similarities between
misdemeanor and felony representation. Part II describes the lack of
constitutional and other norms, such as professional standards, that
speak specifically to the effective assistance of misdemeanor counsel.
Part III explores the institutional competencies of legislators, the
courts, organizations that draft professional standards, and the
defender community, noting ways in which each can take part in the
50
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2003) (listing varying ineligibility periods for
federal student loans, based on number of drug-related convictions); 21 U.S.C. § 862a
(2003) (bars to public benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2003) (bars to public housing).
51
See, e.g., KAREN J. TERRY & JOHN S. FURLONG, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: A “MEGAN’S LAW” SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 2006) (describing
registration and community notification processes with which sex offenders must
comply).
52
See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 2. But see Ronald F. Wright,
Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1531-33
(2011) (describing more salutary practices in some large public defender offices).
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critical dialogue about the representation necessary for fair
administration of misdemeanors.
I.

THE DIFFERENCES, AND CERTAIN SIMILARITIES, BETWEEN
MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY LAWYERING

Just what is a misdemeanor? As a general matter, jurisdictions
divide crimes “into two categories — felonies and misdemeanors.
Misdemeanors are the less serious offenses, for which punishment is
generally limited to one year in jail.”53 Despite this general method of
defining misdemeanors by the penalty imposed for the offense,
legislatures deviate in different ways, resulting in a broad range of
crimes that qualify as misdemeanors depending on the particular
jurisdiction. The result is that a misdemeanor is any crime the relevant
legislature labels a “misdemeanor.”54 For example, second-degree
assault in Maryland, which encompasses common-law battery as well
53
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 11. In some jurisdictions, there
are also “infractions” or “violations,” which are generally offenses that are categorized
as non-criminal even though they may result in a jail sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008) (making marijuana possession a violation); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2009) (“ ‘Violation’ means an offense, other than a
‘traffic infraction,’ for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen
days cannot be imposed.”). The federal criminal code has three categories of
misdemeanors, all for crimes with a maximum sentence of less than one year. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3559(a) (West 2011) (listing Class A, B, and C misdemeanors with
sentences, respectively, of six months to one year, thirty days to six months, and five
to thirty days). All crimes with maximum sentences under five days, or where the
statute does not authorize imprisonment, are classified as “infractions.” 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3559(a)(9) (West 2011). Federal criminal law also recognizes the category of “petty”
offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §19 (2003) (including Class B and C misdemeanors as well as
infractions in definition of “petty offense”). However, this distinction has been
relevant only in connection with defining the right to a jury trial. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called petty offenses were tried without
juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial
provisions.”); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can
be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970)
(holding that six-person jury satisfies Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement). In
Baldwin, the Court rejected New York State’s request that it “draw the line between
‘petty’ and ‘serious’ to coincide with the line between misdemeanor and felony.”
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69.
54
As the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted, “Absent any constitutional
definition or classification, it is competent for the legislature, in creating or defining
an offense, to name it, classify it, and prescribe the punishment for it, subject only to
the limitation that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted.” State v. Kelly, 15 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Minn. 1944).
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as the mere intent to frighten by threat of battery, with no requirement
of physical injury,55 is a misdemeanor “subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years.”56 By contrast, misdemeanor assault in New York
State has a maximum punishment of one year in jail and a
requirement of physical injury;57 if there is no physical injury, the
charge would be harassment — a class of non-criminal “violation” that
carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days in jail.58 In California,
certain crimes are called “wobblers,” meaning that they can be charged
as either a felony or a misdemeanor.59 Iowa has “simple,” “serious,”
and “aggravated” misdemeanors;60 an aggravated misdemeanor
conviction can result in up to two years of incarceration.61
Misdemeanors can be found throughout most sections of any
jurisdiction’s criminal code, including misdemeanor charges for theft,
assault, drug offenses, sex crimes, hate crimes, and fraud.62 Many
55
See Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 209 n.3 (2009) (explaining various common
law crimes encompassed in Maryland’s misdemeanor assault statute).
56
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §3-203 (LexisNexis 2011). Many other
misdemeanors carry lengthy potential sentences. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§5-601 (LexisNexis 2011) (setting out maximum penalty of four years for person
convicted of misdemeanor possession of controlled substance); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW §7-116 (LexisNexis 2011) (setting out maximum penalty of 10 years for person
convicted of misdemeanor failure to deliver documents for merchandise).
57
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2009).
58
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 2008); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3)
(McKinney 2009).
59
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 1999) (the same type of offense may be
prosecuted as felony or misdemeanor); People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 357 (Cal. 2002)
(describing example of “wobbler” crime); see also Erin R. Yoshino, California’s
Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV.
L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 139 (2008) (discussing “wobbler” crimes).
60
IOWA CODE § 701.8 (2003) (“All public offenses which are not felonies are
misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are aggravated misdemeanors, serious misdemeanors,
or simple misdemeanors. Where an act is declared to be a public offense, crime or
misdemeanor, but no other delegation is given, such act shall be a simple
misdemeanor.”).
61
Id. § 903.1(2) (2003) (“When a person is convicted of an aggravated
misdemeanor, and a specific penalty is not provided for, the maximum penalty shall
be imprisonment not to exceed two years.”).
62
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 § 1304(b)(1) (West 2011) (“Hate crimes shall
be punished as follows . . . . If the underlying offense is a violation or unclassified
misdemeanor, the hate crime shall be a class A misdemeanor.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 3543-6-12(a)(1) (West 2011) (listing the elements of Class B misdemeanor home
improvement fraud); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1422(2) (West 2011) (“Possession of
marijuana is a Class B misdemeanor, except that, KRS Chapter 532 to the contrary
notwithstanding, the maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than fortyfive (45) days.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 2010) (“Petit larceny is a class
A misdemeanor.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-33(a) (West 1993) (“Any person who
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public order offenses are misdemeanors.63 There are also numerous
misdemeanors in local ordinances, enacted by the town or city council
or legislature. For example, the Broward County, Florida Board of
County Commissioners made it a misdemeanor to “throw or deposit
litter on any occupied private property within the county, whether
owned by such person or not.”64 Under the New York City
Administrative Code General Vendor Law, it is a misdemeanor for
individuals to sell goods or services in the streets, sidewalks, and
public spaces of New York City without a license from the Department
of Consumer Affairs.65 Both of these local ordinances authorize jail
sentences.66
Advocacy in misdemeanor cases is similar in many respects to
advocacy in felony cases. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in
some jurisdictions, there are high potential penalties for
misdemeanors, and certain offenses move between misdemeanor and
felony categories. Additionally, however a particular crime is labeled,
the collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions render less
significant the line between felonies — at least low-level ones — and
misdemeanors.67 For example, all felonies and a good number of
misdemeanors lead to one or more collateral consequences located in
federal, state, or local law.68 Finally, whatever level of case they
commits a simple assault or a simple assault and battery or participates in a simple
affray is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.415(2) (West
2003) (“Sexual abuse in the third degree is a Class A misdemeanor.”).
63
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.00-240.70 (McKinney 2008) (establishing
twelve public order offenses as misdemeanors).
64
BROWARD, FLA., CODE ch. 21, art. V, § 21-76 (2001).
65
See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-453 (2004) (making unlawful unlicensed general
vending).
66
Id. § 20-472 (2004) (stating that unlicensed vending is “misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars nor more than one
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than three months or by both such
fine and imprisonment”); BROWARD, FLA., CODE ch. 21, art. V § 21-80 (2001)
(authorizing sentence of up to five hundred dollars, imprisonment in county jail not
to exceed sixty days, or both for littering misdemeanor).
67
See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PLEAS OF GUILTY, at xi (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY] (“[T]he collateral consequences of convictions . . . have
increased dramatically . . . . This has also diminished the significance of the
distinction between pleading guilty to a felony or a misdemeanor, as the latter may
also carry significant future consequences for the defendant.”).
68
See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2010final_amends.htm (“This Act
deals with several aspects of the creation and imposition of collateral consequences.
The provisions are largely procedural, and designed to rationalize and clarify policies
and provisions that are already widely accepted in many states.”).
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handle, all criminal defense lawyers must have skills in areas including
interviewing, fact investigation, counseling, negotiation, and trial and
sentencing advocacy.
Despite these similarities, several significant differences between
felony and misdemeanor lawyering highlight the need for specific
attention to standards for misdemeanor representation. This Part
explores three differences: the higher caseloads misdemeanor lawyers
are expected to, and indeed do, carry; the potential for using collateral
consequences of misdemeanor convictions in creative plea bargaining
and sentencing advocacy; and the greater prevalence of complex
constitutional issues in some misdemeanor cases, particularly public
order offenses.69
69
Another significant area with both differences and similarities between
misdemeanors and felonies is that of the well-documented racial and economic
disparities of individuals in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010)
(discussing racial and economic disparities in criminal justice system); see also Marc
Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 37
HUM. RTS. 14 (2010). Although the causes of these disparities cut across both types of
cases, see id. at 14 (describing causes of racial disparity in criminal justice system as
“complicated,” but listing four key factors: disproportionate crime rates, disparities in
criminal justice processing, overlap of race and class effects, and impact of “race
neutral” policies), the effect of racial and economic disparity is particularly significant
in the misdemeanor realm. This is in part due to the sheer volume of misdemeanor
prosecutions, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text, and thus the large
number of non-white individuals charged in the lower courts and leaving those courts
with a permanent criminal record. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION ACT, supra note 68 (“Minorities are far more likely than whites to have a
criminal record: Almost 17% of adult black males have been incarcerated, compared to
2.6% of white males.”); see also Pager, supra note 45. Another factor contributing to
racial disparities is that, unlike violent crime, many misdemeanor arrests flow from
deliberate policing choices linked to particular neighborhoods, which are often nonwhite neighborhoods. See Howell, supra note 45, at 292-93. Finally, the “war on
drugs” has a well-documented disparate effect on blacks and Latinos, and drug
offenses make up a healthy part of lower court dockets. See Paul Butler, One Hundred
Years of Race & Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1048 (2010) (“Threefourths of those imprisoned for drug offenses are black or Latino. In seven states, 80%
to 90% of imprisoned drug offenders are black. Such disparities cannot be explained
by disproportionate use of drugs by African Americans; blacks don’t use drugs more
than any other group, and some studies have even found that they use them less.”);
ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, DIVERTING AND
RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED
FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter DIVERTING AND
RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS] (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2009) (noting 2009 FBI estimates that 45.6% of the 1,663,582 drug arrests
in United States were for possession of marijuana). Full exploration of the race and
class dynamics of the lower courts is beyond the scope of this Article.
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A. Higher Caseloads and Workloads for Misdemeanor Attorneys
The Department of Justice, courts, and advocacy organizations have
recently focused their attention on the role of excessive defender
workloads in the indigent defense crisis.70 In 2009, caseload concerns
led New York State to pass legislation directing its court
administration to “promulgate rules relating to caseloads for attorneys
representing indigent clients in criminal matters in cities of one
million or more” and to formulate a phase-in plan for the court’s
response to the caseload problem.71 Although excessive workloads are
cause for concern in both the felony and misdemeanor context,
individuals facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to suffer the
consequences of the workload strain. As one report noted, “Although
national crime rates have decreased and fewer major crimes are being
committed, indigent defense providers remain burdened with
excessive caseloads consisting of all kinds of cases . . . including
countless minor, petty offense cases.”72 Thus, in Chicago, Atlanta, and
Miami, defenders handle more than 2,000 misdemeanors a year,73 far
above recommended maximum numbers.74 According to a 2007
Department of Justice study,
73 percent of county based public defender offices lacked
enough attorneys to meet these national caseload standards,
70
See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 298 S.W.3d 870, 879-80 (Mo.
2009) (“The excessive number of cases to which the public defender’s offices
currently are being assigned calls into question whether any public defender is
meeting his or her ethical duties of competent and diligent representation in all cases
assigned.”); Donald J. Farole, Jr. & Lynn Langton, A National Assessment of Public
Defender Office Caseloads, 94 JUDICATURE 87, 90 (2010) (concluding that lack of
personnel and resources across country prevents effective representation of indigent
defendants); David Carroll, Gideon Alert: DOJ Data Confirms Existence of Right to
Counsel Workload Crisis in the United States, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (Sept.
17, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-doj-data-confirmsexistence-right-counsel-workload-crisis-united-states (noting how recently published
data by Bureau of Justice Statistics confirm that public defenders are carrying
excessive workloads).
71
Steven Zeidman, Indigent Defense: Caseload Standards, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 2010,
at 6, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202446663975&
_Indigent_Defense_Caseload_Standards&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also A.B. 156,
2009 Assemb., 232d Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
72
Justice Denied America’s Continuing Neglect of our Constitutional Right to Counsel,
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, 72 (2009), [hereinafter “JUSTICE DENIED”],
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (citing FBI crime statistics).
73
See MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 21.
74
See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing national caseload
recommendations).
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while 23 percent of offices had less than half of the necessary
attorneys to meet caseload standards. Only 12 percent of
county public defender offices with more than 5,000 cases per
year had enough lawyers to meet caseload standards.75
In our high-volume criminal justice system, the lure of assembly-line
justice — where defenders fail to deliver even the most rudimentary
services, such as investigation and appropriate client counseling — is
an unfortunate fixture in day-to-day representation in the lower
courts.76
Still, there is general acceptance that attorneys can handle more
misdemeanors than felonies, and there is thus widespread support for
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals’ recommendations of 400 non-traffic misdemeanors per year,
with the number dropping to 150 for felonies.77 These differing
recommendations are likely due in part to the reality of high numbers
of misdemeanors in the criminal justice system, combined with the
reality of a limited pool of resources.78 The differing numbers are also
75

SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 10.
See id. at 13; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 12, 21-22.
77
See Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 38, at 3 (referencing
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
recommendations of 150 felonies, 400 non-traffic misdemeanors, 200 juvenile court
cases, 200 Mental Health Act cases, or 25 non-capital appeals per attorney per year);
see also ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. IN A FREE SOC’Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS:
A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1988), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/special/king/cjic.htm
(stating that ABA endorses National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) caseload
numbers, although list following endorsement notes 300 misdemeanor cap rather than
400 as NAC recommends); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. PREPARED BY THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable, in BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERIES 7-8 (Ser. No. NCJ 185632, 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf (referencing National Advisory Council numbers, but also
noting the need to differentiate between caseloads and workloads). The Washington
State Bar Association has taken a more nuanced approach with its 2007 standards. On
the issue of caseloads, the organization notes a difference between “simple” and
“complex” misdemeanors. Although the standards recommend a caseload of no more
than 300 misdemeanors, they recognize certain exceptions where caseloads might be
adjusted to 400 misdemeanors. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 3 (adopted Sept. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/wsbastandards408.doc.
78
One study noted that “[i]n 2005 State court prosecutors reported closing over
2.4 million felony cases and nearly 7.5 million misdemeanor cases.” Steve W. Perry,
Prosecutors in State Courts, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. 6 (Ser.
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
No. NCJ 213799, 2006),
pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. The actual difference between prosecuted misdemeanors and
felonies is even greater, as only 95% of all state prosecutors’ offices reported handling
76
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undoubtedly due to the fact that there can be little disagreement that
an attorney handling a complex multi-count felony indictment that
exposes her client to decades in prison will require more time to
prepare than an attorney handling a misdemeanor assault with two
witnesses and no medical records. It is not troubling that attorneys
assigned to both kinds of cases will devote more attention to clients
charged with the complex felony. What is troubling is that there are
no constitutional, ethical, or professional standards to guide attorneys
in deciding how to divide that attention, and to ensure that attorneys
provide misdemeanor clients with effective representation.
As Professor Steve Zeidman noted in his commentary on caseload
caps for public defenders, “Numbers should not be the only, nor
primary, way to assess defense attorney effectiveness.”79 Thus, even if
there is agreement that attorneys can handle more misdemeanors than
felonies as a general matter, “[t]here are many variables to consider in
evaluating attorney workloads, including the seriousness and
complexity of assigned cases and the skill and experience of individual
attorneys.”80 For example, although it makes sense for new attorneys
to begin with misdemeanors before moving up to a felony practice, the
skewed caseload recommendations mean that attorneys new to
criminal defense practice (and often right out of law school) will
almost immediately handle large numbers of cases. At the same time,
these new attorneys must learn basic pretrial and trial skills and
familiarize themselves with the local lower criminal court culture. In
some jurisdictions, misdemeanor lawyers might find themselves
moving between several courtrooms, or even between different towns,
in order to handle their assigned cases.81 These factors thus exacerbate
the workload differences between misdemeanors and felonies.
While some felonies require more attorney time and attention than
misdemeanors, this is not always the case. As described below in
Section C, misdemeanor defenders handle a wide variety of charges,
some of which raise complex constitutional or statutory issues not
often seen with felony charges. Further, as described below in Section
B, collateral consequences loom larger in misdemeanor cases, because
misdemeanor cases. Id. at 4 tbl.5. County attorneys or perhaps police officers
presumably prosecuted misdemeanors in the remaining five percent of jurisdictions,
or the court may have handled the disposition without any prosecutorial involvement.
79
Zeidman, supra note 71, at 6 (applauding New York State law calling for rules
on public defender caseloads, but cautioning that “[w]e must do more than zero in on
caseloads”).
80
Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 38, at 2-3.
81
See id. at 4 (“Local court calendar management practices . . . can . . . play havoc
with attorney workloads as can legislative changes and new judicial decisions.”).
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they often overshadow any potential direct criminal sentence. Thus,
there is greater need to counsel clients about the cost of such
consequences compared to the benefits of entering a guilty plea, and
more room for creative plea bargaining in order to avoid unintended
collateral consequences. This requires a working familiarity with a
wide variety of potential collateral consequences, and may require
coordination with one or more experts in the area of any relevant
consequences in order to fully inform the misdemeanor client.82
Given the ways in which misdemeanor representation requires a
particular type of attention, national recognition that misdemeanor
defenders can handle far greater caseloads than felony defenders, and
the realities of assembly-line case processing in the lower courts, the
need for further guidance on the meaning of effective misdemeanor
representation is clear. These differences between felony and
misdemeanor practice highlight the need for standards that are unique
to the misdemeanor context.
B. Minor Criminal Convictions Lead to Major Collateral Consequences
Mary Anne Gehris was adopted by an American couple when she
was two weeks old.83 Her parents did not make her a U.S. citizen, but
Gehris herself later filed the necessary paperwork, correctly noting a
past criminal conviction. By that time, she was married to a U.S.
citizen and had a young son with cerebral palsy.84 Her effort to seek
naturalization resulted in a deportation order. The basis for her
deportation was her ten-year-old misdemeanor battery conviction
based on allegations of fighting another woman over a man. On the
advice of her attorney, she had pled guilty to the charge and received a
suspended sentence with probation.85 After extensive publicity about
her deportation order, the Georgia Board of Pardon and Parole granted
her a pardon, and immigration officials halted her deportation.86
Gehris was one of the lucky few.87 Miguel Angel Hernandez, a lawful
82

See Wright, supra note 52, at 1530-34.
See Stephen Davis, Deported from America, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at
14-15, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/200411220005.
84
Id.
85
See Lewis, supra note 49, at A13.
86
Davis, supra note 83, at 17. Gehris later became a U.S. citizen. See Anthony
Lewis, Op-Ed., Abroad at Home: Rays of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/10/opinion/abroad-at-home-rays-of-hope.html.
87
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 5 (William S. Hein & Co.
ed., 2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/publication.cfm?
83
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permanent resident, also had a misdemeanor battery conviction in
Georgia. He did not get a pardon, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals denied his petition for review of his final order of
deportation.88
Misdemeanor assault is not the only minor crime with such drastic
consequences. Numerous misdemeanor drug convictions can lead to
automatic deportation for non-citizens. This is because “[a]ny alien
who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of
(or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State,
the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”89 Deportation
is only one of many serious collateral consequences of misdemeanor
convictions.90 In many states, a number of misdemeanor sex crime
publication_id=115 (“In at least a dozen states where a governor’s pardon is the
exclusive means of avoiding or mitigating collateral disabilities, the governor has not
exercised the power with any regularity for many years. The federal pardoning process
has also withered in the past twenty years, producing only a handful of grants despite
a steady stream of applications from people who may long since have completed their
court-imposed sentences.”).
88
Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
that Georgia misdemeanor battery statute met definition of “crime of violence” under
federal immigration law so that Hernandez’s conviction under statute, combined with
his suspended one-year sentence, rendered his conviction automatically deportable
“aggravated felony” under federal immigration law).
89
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2011); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on
Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 253, 261 (2002).
90
These consequences are generally referred to as “collateral consequences” of a
criminal conviction because they are not imposed directly by the court as part of the
sentence, but rather flow as a consequence of the conviction. See Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 n.8 (2010) (recognizing that courts are split over distinguishing
and applying distinction between direct and collateral consequences); see also Jenny
Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV.
670, 689-92 (2008) (noting inconsistency in how courts categorize direct versus
collateral consequences, and how consequently there is confusing jurisprudence in
this area). This Article uses the term “collateral” because it is still commonly used by
courts and commentators. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after
Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1883809 (“The term ‘collateral consequences’ has
become a commonplace way of describing the legal penalties and disabilities to which
people are exposed when they plead guilty to a crime, though the term ‘statusgenerated penalties’ might be more apt if not legally precise.”); see also Brown v.
United States, No. 10 Civ. 3012, 2010 WL 5313546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Margaret
C. Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and the Collateral
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convictions can lead to mandatory, long-term sex offender
registration, and in some cases community notification via a publicly
available electronic database.91 A marijuana possession conviction will
lead to the loss of federal student loan assistance for at least a year.92
Low-level drug crime convictions can lead to eviction from public
housing for the individual and his entire family, even if he is not the
leaseholder or even living in the housing.93
The most pervasive collateral effect of a misdemeanor conviction is
the ability to find and keep work. There are a multitude of statutory
and regulatory bars to employment at the local, state, and federal
levels for convicted persons. For example, in New York State a person
with certain misdemeanor convictions cannot work as a home health
aide,94 and in Texas a number of convictions block employment in any
capacity at facilities serving the elderly, terminally ill, or people with
disabilities.95 In addition to formal restrictions, many employers take
Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 18 (2010). But see McGregor Smyth,
From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and its
Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 802 (2011) (noting how, in
wake of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), already-problematic distinction
between so-called collateral and direct consequences is even weaker, and how term
“enmeshed penalty” would better reflect fact that “these penalties are intimately
related to criminal charges (not just convictions), and are serious, often draconian,
and lifelong”); see also McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal
Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U.
TOL. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2005) [hereinafter Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word] (using
term “invisible” consequences).
91
See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168(a) (2011) (defining sex offender to include
individuals convicted of certain misdemeanors); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168(f) (2011)
(requiring sex offenders to register); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection & Safety
Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2). See generally TERRY & FURLONG, supra note 51
(discussing SORA and community notification).
92
20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2003) (suspending student loan eligibility for varying
time periods for any “student who is convicted of any offense under any Federal or
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for conduct that
occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student was receiving any grant,
loan, or work assistance”). But see id. § 1091(r)(2) (allowing for resumption of loan
assistance upon showing of “rehabilitation”).
93
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2011) (allowing for eviction of tenant in federal
housing where tenant, member of tenant’s household, or guest of tenant is convicted
of, or involved with, drug-related activity, even if tenant lacks knowledge of that
activity); Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002) (upholding
eviction of grandparent tenants under 42 U.S.C. § 1437 based on drug activity on
public housing grounds, including tenants’ grandsons smoking marijuana in
apartment complex parking lot).
94
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 845-b(5)(b) (McKinney 2011).
95
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 250.006 (West 2007) (listing numerous
criminal convictions that are permanent or five-year bar to employment in facilities
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advantage of easy electronic access to criminal records and use the
information to avoid hiring anyone with any type of record, even if
there is no connection between that conviction and the type of work.96
“I’ve come to expect being turned down,” is how Justin Gannon
described his ongoing search for a job.97 He had several job offers, all
later rescinded. Despite his eight years of Army National Guard
service, leading to a drawer full of medals for meritorious service and a
2009 honorable discharge certification, he is among the 16% of
Ohioans — 1.9 million people — with a criminal conviction. He was
convicted of misdemeanor assault in 2003 after a bar fight, and says
that he pled guilty because he was scared of going to jail and because
he was “told the misdemeanor wouldn’t be that big of a deal on my
record.” Mr. Gannon is not alone, as there were 258,000 new
misdemeanor convictions in 2008 in Ohio.98
The large number and harsh nature of collateral consequences
illustrate how even a low-level conviction that seems to begin with
arrest and end in front of the judge can actually have an impact not
only on that person’s life, but also on the lives of family members and
the person’s community. For example, an NAACP Legal Defense Fund
survey of thirty women incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, designed
to document “social costs” of Mississippi’s poor quality public defense
system, “found that nearly half of the women lost a home or
apartment, while 12 lost vehicles. More than half of the women had
children living with them when they were arrested and had to move in
with relatives. Eight women had elderly parents who were affected
financially.”99 These examples demonstrate how misdemeanor
convictions can negatively affect a person’s ability to be a productive
serving elderly, terminally ill, or people with disabilities).
96
Many states have human rights or other state laws prohibiting employers from
discriminating against individuals with criminal records unless there is a legitimate
connection to the type of work. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2011)
(banning unfair licensure or employment discrimination against persons convicted of
one or more crimes); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15)-(16) (McKinney 2011) (making it
unlawful to inquire about, or deny license or employment to any person with past
convictions). However, the efficacy of such laws is open to question and their
enforcement mechanisms — many largely rely on private enforcement through
individual complaints — leaves something to be desired.
97
Mary McCarty, Criminal Records Keeping Millions of Ohioans Jobless, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS (June 25, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime/
criminal-records-keeping-millions-of-ohioans-jobless-1193628.html.
98
Id. (noting numbers provided by Ed Rhine, deputy director for Ohio’s office of
offender re-entry, who also noted how marking box on job application that asks about
convictions is “[i]n most cases . . . sufficient to get that application tossed out”).
99
See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 18.
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member of society and, therefore, should be cause for serious
concern.100 This is especially true where large percentages of
individuals in a particular community have criminal convictions. The
public safety effect on a community when many members are
incarcerated or unable to find work because of a minor conviction
cannot be underestimated in a cost-benefit analysis of low-level
prosecutions.101
The re-entry movement has brought attention to “[o]ne of the most
profound challenges facing American society”102 — the re-integration
of the more than 700,000 adults exiting state and federal prisons each
year into their communities.103 The movement’s focus has largely been
on this prison-to-community transition, recognizing the critical link
between recidivism, public safety, and the ability to work past
significant obstacles in order to successfully function after leaving
prison.104 Re-entry from incarceration also affects large numbers of
individuals, their families, and their communities.105 Similarly, some of
the sociological literature argues that the social costs of incarceration
100
Indeed, it is hard to justify the effects of many misdemeanor convictions under
traditional theories of punishment if the collateral consequences are factored into the
equation. An important, related front in this area is to incorporate the consideration of
third party interests into general criminal law theories of punishment. See Daryl K.
Brown, Third Party Interests, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1408-20 (2002). Taking the
collateral consequences that criminal prosecutions cause to innocent third parties
(families, communities) into account in our theoretical construct for the criminal
justice system means moving beyond strict retributivist or deterrence theories — or
even theories that combine these two dominant strains — to include a consideration
of third party interests. See generally DIEDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT:
RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 23 (2005) (pointing out that costbenefit analyses of punishment theories usually ignore cost of harm to person
punished).
101
See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 2 (“Families are torn apart when a loved
one is sent to prison or can no longer work due to the collateral consequences of a
conviction. Communities suffer both in terms of public safety and through
unnecessarily losing friends, neighbors and co-workers who are locked up.”).
102
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3 (2003); see also Jeremy Travis,
But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, 5(3) CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 23
(2001).
103
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010). As a general matter,
misdemeanor sentences involving incarceration are served in jails and longer felony
sentences in prisons. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2189 (2010) (“Broadly speaking,
felonies are punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or state prison, and
misdemeanors by imprisonment in a county jail or the like.”).
104
See generally PETERSILIA, supra note 102 (noting ineffectiveness of current reentry programs and proposing solutions to improve it).
105
Id. at 223-28.
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actually work against crime prevention.106 To be sure, this is important
work in an area that was largely previously ignored.
However, the collateral effects of minor convictions are to some
extent lost in this analysis. The very fact of a conviction — even
without any jail time — can lead to many of the same social effects
described in these studies.107 Yet there has not been sufficient focus on
the effects of the massive number of newly minted “misdemeanants”
coming from a trip to the courthouse each year. An individual who is
fully informed about such things as deportation, bars to employment,
or getting kicked out of public housing because of a misdemeanor
conviction will be focused on avoiding any conviction that would lead
to collateral consequences most relevant to that particular individual.
Thus, a primary focus of misdemeanor defenders, and the institutions
that set standards for effective representation, should also be the high
collateral costs of lower court convictions. In this light, standards for
the type and quality of misdemeanor defense counsel assistance is
critical and may be different from standards in serious felony cases.
A variety of potential reforms might ameliorate counterproductive
and unjustly severe collateral consequences. These include
decriminalization of certain low-level offenses,108 prosecutorial
discretion in charging and plea bargaining to avoid unintended
collateral consequences, additional resources for the reintegration of
those with convictions,109 and public education campaigns so that
employers, landlords, and others are willing to give individuals with
106

See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Inequality and Republican Criminology, in CRIME AND
INEQUALITY 277, 283-84 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (arguing that
family and social networks work better for crime control than criminal sanctions);
Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008)
(explaining how imprisonment may have criminogenic rather than deterrent effects);
John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, in 28 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 44-45 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001) (arguing that “life-course account” can
explain desistance of criminal offenders, that changes in criminality are caused by
variations in information social control and bonds, and that salient life events such as
work and marriage affect these bonds).
107
See Pager, supra note 45, at 960-62; see also MARK MAUER, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 6-7, 13 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that our criminal justice
system is stuck in punitive response mode even though neighborhoods are perceived
“safe” when clean, well-lit, and have open businesses, not when heavily policed or
have the death penalty).
108
See infra Part III.A; see also David Abel, Voters Approve Marijuana Law Change,
THE BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2008/11/05/voters_approve_marijuana_law_change/.
109
For an example of some such resources, see generally REENTRY.NET,
http://www.reentry.net (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
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convictions a chance.110 These are important ideas, all worthy of
further attention. To the extent that they focus on remediation at the
front end of a potential criminal case, such as decriminalization or the
exercise of charging discretion, they confront the problem of
overloaded defender systems as well as the effect of minor convictions
on individuals, families, and communities. Still, they do not directly
address the problem of defining appropriate standards for delivery of
the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases that go forward. Such
standards are critical to ensuring that justice inheres in the process
itself, so that the many individuals in the misdemeanor system do not
receive unwarranted convictions or overly harsh sentences.
C. Complexities of Misdemeanor Practice
Although misdemeanors are the usual training ground for new
attorneys, they can also be just as complicated as typical felony cases.
Like felonies, misdemeanor cases raise issues of suppression in drug
and weapons cases,111 expert testimony in drug, assault, and drunk
driving cases,112 and Crawford/Confrontation Clause issues in
domestic violence and other types of cases.113 Therefore, attorneys
handling misdemeanor cases grapple with many of the same legal
issues as felony attorneys. Proper representation on these issues
requires the same skills in interviewing and counseling the client,
negotiating with the prosecution, and conducting factual investigation
and legal research.

110

See Sample Letters to Employers, REENTRY.NET, http://www.reentry.net/ny/
library/folder.83212-Sample_Letters_to_Employers (last visited Oct. 19, 2011)
(offering sample letters educating employers about employment rights of people with
criminal records).
111
See, e.g., State v. Remy, No. 02CA2664, 2003 WL 21152881, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 25, 2003) (denying motion to suppress crack pipe in misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia case); Russell v. State, 74 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App.
2002) (denying motion to suppress evidence in misdemeanor marijuana possession
case on grounds that reasonable suspicion is not required for school search).
112
See, e.g., State v. McClain, 301 S.W.3d 97, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that
expert testified to weight of marijuana in grams because weight determines whether
person is guilty of misdemeanor or felony under Missouri state law).
113
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 814, 828 (2006) (finding victim’s
statements that identified her assailant during 911 call were not “testimonial” for
purposes of Confrontation Clause because they were made to get help for immediate
physical threat); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (holding that outof-court “testimonial” statements are inadmissible under Confrontation Clause unless
declarant is unavailable to testify and accused has had prior opportunity to crossexamine).
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Beyond these commonalities, misdemeanor lawyers sometimes
encounter complex constitutional issues that are not found as
frequently in the felony arena. For example, public order offenses such
as disorderly conduct or unlawful assembly often implicate free
speech, overbreadth, and vagueness issues.114 As the Supreme Court
noted:
We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more.
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often
bristle with thorny constitutional questions.115
Misdemeanor lawyers would raise such constitutional issues in pretrial
motion practice, such as in a motion to dismiss a charging document
as facially unconstitutional based on the vague and overbroad nature
of the underlying criminal charge.116 Defense counsel might also
engage in pretrial litigation about the sufficiency of a charging
document because misdemeanors normally proceed upon an
accusatory instrument — which is essentially an affidavit noting the
crimes charged and basic factual allegations, signed by a police officer,
prosecutor, or complaining witness — rather than a grand jury
indictment or a preliminary hearing.117 Attorneys with overwhelming
workloads will lack the time necessary to litigate these important
issues. This is particularly troubling in an era of sharply rising
misdemeanor and steeply declining felony prosecutions, and
enormous growth in the numbers of collateral consequences of
misdemeanor convictions.118 Challenges to problematic public order

114

See, e.g., People v. Biltsted, 574 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991)
(finding criminal law banning unlawful assembly is not vague, overbroad, or
unconstitutional where actions of individual charged “constitute an incitement which
is both directed towards and likely to produce imminent violent and tumultuous
conduct”).
115
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (internal citations omitted).
116
See Bilsted, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
117
See, e.g., People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 2000) (affirming denial of
defendant’s motion to dismiss, and setting forth sufficiency requirements of charging
document in misdemeanor cases); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (McKinney
2011) (defining “accusatory instrument”).
118
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (describing rising misdemeanor
prosecutions and falling felonies); supra Part I.B. (describing collateral consequences
of minor criminal convictions).
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offenses, or to a prosecution office practice of insufficient notice to
defendants in charging documents, are critical where elected officials’
or legislators’ beliefs about the need to be “tough on crime” can eclipse
other considerations relevant to public safety and fairness in the
administration of criminal justice.119
In addition to the potential for complex pretrial motions,
misdemeanor attorneys often handle a large variety of crimes, codified
in a variety of sources. A misdemeanor attorney might simultaneously
handle cases from the state penal law, such as drug possession, theft,
assault, or domestic violence;120 from the traffic code, such as driving
with a suspended license; and from the local administrative code, such
as unlicensed general vending or sale of a weapon without a safetylocking device.121 By contrast, felony counsel may have a more limited
variety of cases, particularly when the jurisdiction has a heavy number
of felony drug prosecutions.122 When counsel handles one type of case
in great volume — for example drug sales, where the main witnesses
are undercover or other police officers who may refuse to speak with
defense counsel, thus limiting the potential for investigation on the
case — that defender will have fewer pretrial tasks than in some
misdemeanor cases.
The many facets of misdemeanor advocacy provide excellent
training for new attorneys, but it would demonstrate ignorance of the
119

See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., M.D. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 5-601 (West 2011); see also Table 30:
County Court Misdemeanor Filings by Type, FY 2008, COLO. STATE JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/
Annual_Statistical_Reports/2008/Table30.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) (indicating
that domestic violence crimes accounted for 18% of Colorado misdemeanor filings in
2008).
121
See, e.g., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-472 (McKinney 2004) (making unlicensed
general vending “a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred
fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more
than three months or by both such fine and imprisonment”); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 10311 (2010) (making it a misdemeanor, punishable by up to 90 days in jail, $500 fine,
or both, “for any person or business enterprise to dispose of any weapon which does
not contain a safety locking device”).
122
For example, felony drug arrests accounted for 39,435 out of 124,111 total
felonies in Los Angeles County in 2008. Adult Felony Arrests, 2008, Offense by
Jurisdiction and Gender, CAL. STATE DEP’T JUST., http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/
prof08/19/15.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). Between 1994 and 2006, drug charges
comprised the largest group of felony cases in the 75 largest counties, ranging from
34% to 37% of total felony cases. Thomas Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony
Defendants in Large Urban Counties, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL.
2 (Ser. No. NCJ 228944, 2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.
120
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true nature of misdemeanor practice to say that it is always easier, less
complex work.123 The consequences — at least the direct, penal
consequences — may be lower, but the work can be just as
challenging as the majority of felony prosecutions in a typical
jurisdiction.
D. Coercion and Plea Bargaining in the Misdemeanor Context
Judges, practitioners, and scholars have all long acknowledged the
potential for, and existence of, coercion in the plea bargain process.124
These concerns focus on the disparity between the offered sentence
and the higher sentence that a defendant will receive should he lose at
trial.125 Although the limited amount of possible jail time narrows this
disparity in the misdemeanor context, there are structural features of
the lower courts that raise troubling — and often overlooked — issues
of coercion in minor cases. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the
volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony
prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result.”126
With such a high volume of misdemeanors and other minor cases,
judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors all have enormous incentive
123

Clearly there are felony cases that are far more complex than any misdemeanor.
Death penalty cases are one example, as are homicide or other cases involving forensic
issues. However, these cases do not comprise the majority of the caseload of a typical
felony attorney. See Cohen & Kyckelhahn, supra note 122, at 2 (noting how drug
charges were largest group of felony cases in the 75 largest counties between 1994 and
2006).
124
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L.
REV 652, 687-89 (1981) (describing potential coercive effects of plea bargaining);
Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Cooperation in the Plea Bargaining Process,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349 (2004) (describing coercive powers that judges may exert on
defendants during plea bargaining process); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1060-62 (1984) (listing possible inducement to
plead guilty when no significant concessions were granted). The potential for coercion
actually applies to the guilty plea process more broadly, bargain or no bargain, since
in most instances the judge gives the defendant a significant sentence discount if he
pleads guilty to all charges prior to trial.
125
See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1975 (1992) (explaining how defendants balance benefits against drawbacks of
accepting proposed plea); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial
Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 87-88 (2005) (arguing that there
is significant difference between sentences imposed after guilty plea and those
imposed after trial); cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-96 (2004) (noting institutional features of criminal
justice system that lead to atmosphere that can coerce guilty pleas).
126
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1972).
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to pursue early guilty pleas — as early as the initial arraignment in
some jurisdictions.127 There is serious institutional pressure from all
quarters to quickly “dispose of” misdemeanor cases, often before
defense counsel can undertake any investigation or adequately review
any discovery material.128 A study for New York State’s then-high court
Chief Judge revealed that by the year 2000 in New York City, private
attorneys representing indigent defendants through an assignedcounsel plan “were disposing of 69 percent of all misdemeanor cases
at arraignment.”129 The same study described how the Legal Aid
Society, New York City’s largest provider of indigent defense services,
had “permanent arraignment lawyers who . . . only take misdemeanor
arraignments and . . . ‘know the going rate of a case’ on misdemeanors
and violations and therefore try to take only those cases that can be
disposed of at arraignment.”130
One might argue that this early plea system is often beneficial to the
defendant, who gets a good bargain without returning to court many
times in exchange for his prompt decision to plead guilty.131 Although
it is certainly true that some defendants (particularly those with
lengthy criminal records) benefit from this type of system, many
defendants do not gain much from such a process. They may feel
enormous pressure from all sides to enter a quick guilty plea. In
addition, although quick and early guilty pleas are encouraged in part
to free up scarce resources in order to focus on more “serious” cases,
the fact remains that pleas in this environment are often taken without
much assistance of counsel at all. For example, counsel focused on
moving misdemeanors along quickly, with a goal of clients taking
pleas at the first appearance, would be hard-pressed to fulfill her
ethical and constitutional duties to counsel clients about collateral

127
See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 13 (“In many jurisdictions across the
country defenders meet with their clients minutes before their court appearance in
courthouse hallways, often just presenting an offer for a plea bargain from the
prosecution without ever conducting an investigation into the facts of the case or the
individual circumstances of the client.”).
128
See Zeidman, supra note 26, at 331 n.86 (stating that there should be no pleas at
arraignment).
129
Status of Indigent Defense in New York: A Study for Chief Judge Kaye’s Commission on
the Future of Indigent Defense Services, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, 142 (2006),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf
[hereinafter “Spangenberg Study”].
130
Id. at 144.
131
See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (praising autonomy and efficiency aspects of plea
bargaining).
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consequences of any guilty plea.132 In one particularly egregious case
of pressure to plead guilty early (and to waive counsel), defendants in
a Broward County, Florida courtroom were handed a form explaining
how the fee for court-appointed attorneys was $50 for a plea entered at
arraignment, and $350 for a plea after arraignment.133 The same study
that detailed the Broward County form, a study that involved 1,649
misdemeanor adjudications in twenty-one Florida counties, showed
that “[a]lmost 70% of defendants observed entered a guilty or no
contest plea at arraignment.”134
Perhaps the most coercive aspect of plea-bargaining in the lower
criminal courts is pretrial detention for individuals held on bail that
they cannot pay.135 In such cases, defendants must generally choose
between remaining in jail to fight the case or taking an early plea with
a sentence of time served or probation. In the Florida study, the “most
significant predictor of defendants entering a plea of guilty or no
contest at arraignment was their custody status. In-custody defendants
were more likely to enter a guilty plea than released defendants.”136
Incarcerated individuals will find it difficult to ignore the call of
immediate freedom, particularly if the person is unaware of the myriad
collateral consequences of the guilty plea and thus does not factor
these consequences into the cost-benefit analysis of an immediate
guilty plea.137
With misdemeanors, the problem of coercion resulting from the
system’s structure, including one’s own defense counsel, is thus
paramount. There is little guidance for defense counsel, or any other
institutional actor, on where the line between coercion and advice lies
in the lower courts.138 The incentive structure that encourages
132

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (articulating counsel’s
duty to warn about deportation); see also ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 192.3 (3d ed. 2004).
133
See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 18 app. C.
134
Id. at 14-15. A “no contest,” or nolo contendere, plea is when “a defendant does
not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes
the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.” North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970).
135
See Bibas, supra note 125, at 2491-93.
136
THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15.
137
See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 725-28
(2011) (noting how full information about serious collateral consequences of criminal
conviction will factor into defendant’s decision-making process about whether to
plead guilty or go to trial).
138
See generally Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and
Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 888 (1998) (discussing continuum of
approaches when counseling client about guilty plea, ranging from neutrality to
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coercion, and the real presence of such coercion in some instances,
demonstrates why guidance on effective assistance in misdemeanor
cases is so important.
II.

LACK OF GUIDANCE ON THE MEANING OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANORS

If misdemeanor cases are important enough to prosecute, then they
are important enough to analyze in terms of the appropriate level of
representation. The message to society in prosecuting individuals in
these cases is that they matter and that it is important to hold people
accountable for such conduct. Whether or not one agrees with that
message, a concomitant message should be that those charged with
such offenses deserve a lawyer who does an effective job. In addition
to upholding the constitutional right to such representation, there are
a number of reasons to ensure effective misdemeanor representation.
For a number of cases, an overburdened or incompetent
misdemeanor lawyer could get the same result as a committed, wellresourced public defender or high-quality private counsel. For
example, a prosecutor may routinely offer some type of deferred
dismissal in all first-arrest shoplifting cases, and anyone with an
attorney will get this same offer.139 The experienced defender might
knock a few hours of community service off of the requirements for
the dismissal, but the results are basically the same for that defender
and the lawyer who simply conveys the prosecution’s offer to her
client without any negotiation over terms. However, many low-level
cases are not so simple, and do not result in dismissal for the asking.
In addition, in a significant number of cases with quality public or
private representation, counsel might uncover something during the
investigation or client interviewing and counseling process that will
make a difference.
From a procedural justice perspective, recent research has
demonstrated the importance of fair treatment if we want defendants,
their families, and communities to have more faith in and respect for
the criminal justice system.140 Surely the quality of one’s counsel must
urging).
139
Based on my own experience in the lower courts of several different
jurisdictions, prosecutors do not make the same “standard” offers to defendants
proceeding pro se. Prosecutors will often first – and sometimes only – present pro se
defendants with the option to plead guilty to the crime or crimes charged (in
situations where a defendant represented by counsel would receive a more generous
offer).
140
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (2006) (noting how
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play a large role in these perceptions of legitimacy — or lack
thereof.141
What, then, is the current state of the law on effective assistance of
counsel, and what professional standards govern, in the misdemeanor
context? The short answer is that these guideposts do not seem to
exist. There is no developed body of case law or professional standards
that address the meaning of the right to effective assistance of counsel
in the specific context of misdemeanors and other low-level
adjudications.
A. The Threshold Issue of the Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not apply to all misdemeanors.
Generally, the Sixth Amendment confers the right to state-funded
counsel for indigent defendants.142 Before 1972, the Court’s right-tocounsel jurisprudence derived exclusively from felony cases, and some
lower courts explicitly placed “petty offenses” outside the scope of the
Sixth Amendment.143 Since that time, the Argersinger-Scott-Shelton
legitimacy--defined as “the belief that one ought to obey the law”--has an effect “on
people’s everyday behavior toward the law” and thus “plays an important role in
promoting compliance” with the law).
141
See, e.g., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE
COLLABORATIONS, at ix (Feb. 1999), www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf (“Ultimately, as
Attorney General Janet Reno states, the lack of competent, vigorous legal
representation for indigent defendants calls into question the legitimacy of criminal
convictions and the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole.”).
142
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (under Sixth Amendment, applicable to states
through Fourteenth Amendment, state courts must appoint counsel to individuals
who cannot afford to hire private counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)
(“[i]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel . . . it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law”).
143
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §11.2(a) (5th. ed. 2009). This
is in stark contrast to the British common law history of the right to counsel.
“Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of
counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest.
At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were
entitled to the full assistance of counsel.” Powell, 287 U.S. at 61. This rule was
“constantly, vigorously, and sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and
lawyers,” and ultimately “rejected by the colonies.” Id. at 60-61; see also Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979) (noting how pre–Sixth Amendment common law
“perversely gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those
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troika of Supreme Court decisions has set forth the contours for nonfelony cases, finding that any imposed or suspended sentence of
incarceration triggers the right to counsel.144 Under these
constitutional standards governing the scope of the Sixth Amendment,
some individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses enjoy the right
to appointed counsel, and others do not.
The right to misdemeanor counsel is a restraint on a judge’s ability
to impose any sentence of incarceration when a defendant is convicted
without counsel, unless that defendant entered a valid waiver of the
right to counsel.145 This ex post approach does not consider the
possible sentences listed in the statute under which an individual is
charged. Nor is it an affirmative directive to judges determining when
they should appoint counsel in a particular case. Rather, the state can
forgo appointing counsel in a misdemeanor case only if the judge is
willing to forgo any potential for a sentence involving actual or
suspended incarceration.146
Many states extend the guarantee of counsel beyond the federal
floor, with some states making it available any time the relevant
accused of misdemeanors”).
144
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (finding that Sixth Amendment
bars imposition of suspended sentence when underlying sentence followed
“uncounseled conviction”); Scott, 440 U.S. at 371-73 (1979) (no right to counsel for
sentence of fine); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (“We hold, therefore,
that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.”).
145
See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662 (“Where the State provides no counsel to an
indigent defendant, does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended
sentence upon the defendant’s violation of the terms of probation? We conclude that it
does not.”); see also id. at 664 (restating Argersinger’s command that “no person may
be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”).
146
Thus, in Shelton the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Alabama
Supreme Court, which had affirmed Shelton’s underlying misdemeanor assault
conviction as well as that part of the sentence imposing a fine, but had vacated that
part of his sentence imposing probation attached to a suspended jail sentence. Id. at
659, 674; see also id. at 671 (noting how “[a]lthough they may not attach probation to
an imposed and suspended prison sentence, States unable or unwilling routinely to
provide appointed counsel to misdemeanants in Shelton’s situation are not without
recourse to another option capable of yielding a similar result,” and describing pretrial
probation option for uncounseled misdemeanors). Similarly, the Court in Scott upheld
the underlying conviction because, even though incarceration was a potential penalty
for the misdemeanor theft charge in that case, the trial court imposed only a fine.
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74 (“We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him
the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”).
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criminal statute in a case authorizes the judge to impose a sentence of
imprisonment, regardless of the actual sentence imposed.147
Unfortunately, recent studies describe how some jurisdictions fail —
or even purposely refuse — to comply with either the Argersinger line
of cases or their own more rigorous state rule. For example, a Bureau
of Justice report found that 28% of jail inmates charged with
misdemeanors stated, when interviewed, that they had no counsel.148
Such judicial disrespect for the rules governing the right to counsel is
starkly illustrated by the South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice’s
statement at that state’s public bar association meeting:
Alabama v. Shelton is one of the more misguided decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, I must say. If we adhered to
it in South Carolina we would have the right to counsel
probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to
take these cases in every magistrate’s court in South Carolina,
and I have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t have
the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up that we
[are] not adhering to Alabama v. Shelton in every situation.”149
As the overwhelming majority of all prosecutions are misdemeanors,
both rules and practice in this area play a large role in the experience

147
See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668 (“Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law
right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal
Constitution.”). There are two ways a state can expand upon the federal standard for
the right to counsel: the state high court can declare a more stringent standard as a
matter of state constitutional law, or the state legislature can pass a statute granting
the greater right. See, e.g., B. Mitchell Simpson, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged
With Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
417, 426 (2000) (surveying varying state laws on appointment of misdemeanor
counsel and noting that 36 states expand upon Argersinger right in various iterations).
As of 2001, “All but 16 States . . . would provide counsel to a defendant . . . either
because he received a substantial fine or because state law authorized incarceration for
the charged offense or provided for a maximum prison term of one year.” Shelton, 535
U.S. at 668-69 (citing relevant examples from cases and statutes in various states).
148
See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14 (citing Caroline
Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, in U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (Ser. No. NCJ 179023, 2000), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/dccc.txt). But see id. at 15 (noting that
NACDL’s own site visits for its misdemeanor report suggest that the correct
percentage is even higher). The ABA has also documented the widespread failure to
provide counsel in misdemeanor cases. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at
22-23; see also Spangenberg Study, supra note 129, at 86-88 (describing how
misdemeanor guilty pleas are taken in New York State’s town and village courts
without presence of counsel).
149
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14.
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of individuals in the criminal justice system.150 Indeed, they determine
who is and who is not entitled to counsel, as well as whether those
entitled actually get counsel. It is clear that, at least in some
jurisdictions, even those entitled to counsel in misdemeanor cases do
not always get to exercise that right. Obviously, the appointment of
counsel for all individuals qualifying for misdemeanor representation
is a necessary predicate to any examination of the meaning of effective
counsel in those cases. Studies have explored some potential remedies
for the serious problem of such outright denial of the right to
counsel.151 This Article moves beyond this baseline issue to explore
the type of misdemeanor assistance the Constitution guarantees.
B. The Failure to Define Effective Misdemeanor Lawyering
There are a number of sources that could provide guidance on the
particular meaning of effective misdemeanor representation. These
sources include Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence and professional organizations’ standards for defense
practice.152 This section briefly describes how each of these sources
currently fails to provide norms for misdemeanor representation.
1.

Lack of Misdemeanor Representation Guidance in Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Jurisprudence

In Powell v. Alabama and Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court
established the right to counsel in federal and state felony
prosecutions.153 The Court then moved forward to explore the more
150
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (citing statistics on misdemeanors
from several jurisdictions).
151
See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 45; Spangenberg
Study, supra note 129, at 155-64 (noting need for increased funding, and stricter
requirements and recertification for attorneys). Professor Paul Marcus has made a
convincing argument that, in part because of the potentially severe collateral
consequences of any criminal conviction, the right to counsel should extend to all
prosecutions, not only those with an imposed or suspended sentence of incarceration.
See Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 187-88
(2009).
152
See infra Part III.C (considering defense community as another potential
source).
153
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1963) (holding right to counsel
to apply to state felony prosecutions through Sixth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (noting right to counsel located in Fourteen Amendment’s Due
Process Clause); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (holding
right to counsel applies to any “critical stage” of prosecution).
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nuanced questions of the quality of guaranteed counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, building on its statement that “[i]t has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”154 In the 1984 case Strickland v. Washington, the
Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Under this test, a defendant must
demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s representation was incompetent as
judged by prevailing professional norms; and (2) this incompetency
prejudiced the defendant.155 The following year, the Court held this
same test applicable in the guilty plea context.156
Despite the variety of structural impediments to judicial review of
ineffective assistance claims in misdemeanor cases explored below in
Part III.A.1, the limited number of lower federal and state courts that
have reviewed such claims applied Strickland’s two-prong analysis.157
As the Supreme Court noted with respect to its right-to-counsel
jurisprudence more generally, “[b]oth Powell and Gideon involved
felonies. But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where
an accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon suggest that
there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal
prosecutions . . . .”158 Because the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of that counsel, it is clear that the well-established
Strickland test is the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance
claims in misdemeanor as well as felony cases.159
154

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Dripps, supra note 22.
156
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Although this landmark case
established the test for ineffective assistance claims following guilty pleas, neither Hill
nor any later Supreme Court case examined the meaning of the first (attorney
competence) prong for guilty pleas. Instead, Hill made quick work of applying this
newly declared framework to reject Hill’s claim. The decision devoted only two short
paragraphs to its finding that Hill failed to demonstrate prejudice, thus rendering
unnecessary any exploration of Hill’s claim that he pled guilty only after his attorney’s
misadvice about parole eligibility. Id. at 60.
157
See, e.g., Smith v. Mun. Court of Franklin Cnty., 802 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1986)
(noting how district court properly applied Strickland standard in federal habeas
corpus petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with state
court misdemeanor); United States v. Somerset, No. 3:03-po-002, 2009 WL 3763058,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (noting, in allegation of ineffective assistance in misdemeanor
case, how “[e]ach area of asserted deficient performance is analyzed in terms of the
Strickland standard: deficient performance and prejudice”); United States v. Busse, 814
F. Supp. 760, 764-65 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (stating, in review of misdemeanor conviction,
that “upon the facts presented, the defendant has satisfied both prongs of the
Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel”).
158
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972).
159
There are a limited number of cases in which the standard in Stickland’s
155
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However, the Strickland test offers little concrete guidance to lower
courts analyzing actual claims of ineffective assistance and to defense
attorneys regulated by its Sixth Amendment holding. The Strickland
decision emphasized how courts examining ineffective assistance
claims must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’ ”160 The Court’s reliance on such a presumption was a sound
rejection of any type of checklist approach for ineffective assistance.161
The “wide range” of possible acceptable behavior, as one commentator
noted, “make[s] clear that one searching for the content of the
reasonably effective assistance standard must look primarily to judicial
decisions applying that standard.”162
In felony cases, particularly in the death penalty area, this content
exists; the same cannot be said in the misdemeanor context. There is
no well-developed body of lower court decisions on issues specific to
ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases, and the Supreme Court
has never had the occasion to apply the Strickland test in a case
challenging a misdemeanor conviction. After giving some examples of
ineffective assistance norms in the felony context, the remainder of
this section explores the lack of such content for misdemeanor
practice.

companion case, United States v. Cronic, applies. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984). In the Cronic line of cases, a defendant who can demonstrate suffering from
the actual or constructive denial of any counsel is relieved of Strickland’s prejudice
requirement. Id. at 658; see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (“If
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”). However, courts rarely employ a
presumed prejudice standard based on denial of counsel; rather, Strickland governs
the vast majority of ineffective assistance claims. See Keith Cuningham-Parmeter,
Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice
from Representational Absence, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 827, 881 (2003) (“The application of
Cronic outlined here will affect only a subset of cases involving ineffective assistance
of counsel . . . . Most defendants with valid claims will be unable to establish that their
lawyer’s impairment rose to the level of “absence” required by Cronic.”).
160
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
161
See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà vu All Over Again”:
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to
the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127,
140 (2007).
162
LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 664 (referring to Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986), and Strickland).
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The most fully developed area of ineffective assistance jurisprudence
in felony cases is defense counsel’s failure to investigate. For example,
there are a number of Supreme Court decisions — beginning with
Strickland and continuing with decisions in the past two terms163 —
setting out defense counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence
for the penalty phase of bifurcated death penalty trials.164 The result is
robust guidance to defense attorneys, defender offices, and judges in
capital cases, mandating thorough investigation into the defendant’s
mental capacity, social background, and other potentially mitigating
circumstances.165 Indeed, the criminal defense community responded
to these decisions with a spate of trainings designed to implement the
Court’s directives about more rigorous mitigation investigation.166 The
Court’s application of the Strickland test to a particular context thus
led to changes in defender practices.
The duty to investigate facts and law is not limited to the capital
mitigation context. For example, in a non-capital felony case, the

163
Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3264 (2010); Porter v. McCullough, 130 S. Ct.
447, 453-54(2009); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
164
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s statute
requiring bifurcated trials where there are separate guilt and sentencing phases); Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983) (stating that bifurcated trials “are essential to a
constitutional death sentence”).
165
See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 391 (2005) (noting how defense
counsel failed to examine file that “disclose[d] test results that the defense’s mental
health experts would have viewed as pointing to schizophrenia and other disorders,
and test scores showing a third grade level of cognition after nine years of schooling”);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (“Counsel failed to introduce available
evidence that Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond
sixth grade in school.”).
166
See Seminar Program, Tenn. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Annual Death
Penalty Training: The Fight for Life (Apr. 8-9, 2005), http://www.jenner.com/files/
tbl_s23Events%5CLinktoAgenda1243%5C1238%5CTACDL_Death_Penalty_Seminar.
pdf (including attorney and mitigation specialist from the Wiggins case, with panel on
Tracking Down the Witnesses & Documents You Need to Discover Your Client’s Life
Story.”); see also Seminar Program, Washburn Univ. Sch. of Law, 2003 National
Capital Defense and Mitigation Skills Training Conference (Nov. 6-8, 2003),
http://washburnlaw.edu/cle/programs/200311deathpenalty.php; Seminar Program,
Nat’l Alliance of Sentencing Advocates & Mitigation Specialists, Death Penalty
Mitigation Institute, 3 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1151007501.75/NLADA_NASAMS_2006%20Conference.pdf (“The NASAMS Death
Penalty Mitigation Institute (DPMI) is a specialized one-day training event for capital
mitigation specialists.”); Program Schedule, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, Mitigation
Training Program, http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/cjcc/mitigation_
default.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (describing DePaul Law School’s Mitigation
Training Program, located within its Center for Justice in Capital Cases).
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found ineffective assistance based on
counsel’s “failure to conduct the necessary legal investigation” into a
viable justification defense to a charge of being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm.167 Thus, in addition to guidance on the duty to
investigate capital mitigation evidence, defense lawyers also have
guidance in such areas as the duty to investigate affirmative defenses.
Another example of guidance from the courts about the meaning of
effective assistance is the Ninth Circuit felony case of Riggs v.
Fairman.168 There, the court found ineffective assistance where defense
counsel advised Riggs to reject a plea offer with a five-year prison
term, telling him that the maximum exposure he faced if convicted at
trial was only nine years. After Riggs followed counsel’s advice and
was later convicted at trial, the court sentenced him to twenty-five
years to life under California’s “three strikes” law.169 In finding that
defense counsel’s error constituted incompetent performance under
Strickland’s first prong, the court stated that “[d]efense counsel’s
advice to Riggs was not only erroneous, but egregious, considering the
discrepancy between the two punishments.”170 The difference between
the rejected five-year offer and eventual twenty-five years to life
sentence also led the court to find that Riggs satisfied Strickland’s
prejudice prong, because “[s]uch a discrepancy between the two
sentences would compel any reasonable person to take the deal offered
by the prosecution.”171
In theory, the holdings in these felony cases would guide
misdemeanor representation where there is a right to counsel because,
as noted above, the constitutional standard is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Thus, misdemeanor attorneys would have a duty
to investigate evidence relevant to mitigation of the sentence, a duty to
investigate the facts and law surrounding potential affirmative
defenses before counseling the client about a plea offer, and a duty to
counsel the client about the correct maximum sentence.
In reality, these felony case holdings, grounded in the facts and
practices specific to such serious felony cases, do not offer sufficient
guidance for misdemeanors. This is because misdemeanor attorneys
167
United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding ineffective
assistance where counsel failed to inform client that justification is defense to federal
crime of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, and where facts supported
defense).
168
399 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.

318

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:277

work under the particular, often egregious, conditions of the lower
criminal courts. Misdemeanor attorneys across the country handle
caseloads that make almost any investigation difficult.172 These
attorneys also represent clients in cases where the state or court
routinely make plea or sentence offers at the first appearance or
shortly thereafter, when counsel has not yet interviewed her client, let
alone had time to research the law and facts of any affirmative
defenses or sentence mitigation.173 These are some of the conditions
relevant to misdemeanor practice that differ from felony
representation, and that call for fact-specific analysis from the courts
in order to establish a jurisprudence of ineffective assistance that can
realistically apply to misdemeanors. This is not to say that courts
should excuse inadequate representation on the basis of egregious
conditions that preclude more rigorous advocacy.174 Indeed, judicial
analysis of misdemeanor ineffective assistance might well result in a
strong message to legislatures about the need for reform.175
There is a small but significant group of cases that address some of
the workload and other issues that dominate misdemeanor
representation, even though they are not focused on misdemeanors.
These cases involve systemic challenges to the delivery of indigent
defense in a particular jurisdiction. For example, a Connecticut state
court class action “challenged excessive attorney caseloads,
substandard rates of compensation for attorneys, and a lack of
adequate representation for juvenile defendants.”176 However, of the
limited number of an early group of such cases that met with initial
success, “the relief . . . has not been sustained.”177 Although several
172

See supra Part I.A (discussing caseloads in misdemeanor cases).
See supra Part I.D.
174
See infra Part II.A.2 (rejecting idea of resource deprivation driving
constitutional rules).
175
See infra notes 242-46 (describing constitutional road maps for legislatures in
the area of criminal procedure).
176
Cara Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 445 (2009) (describing Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV
950545629S, 1998 WL 96407, at *15-17 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 1998)). Professor
Drinan has documented what she calls the first two generations of such challenges,
and suggested approaches for the forthcoming “third generation” of indigent defense
litigation. These lawsuits take various forms, including challenges to the defender
system in the context of an individual criminal case, and cases that use a class action
model. Id. at 433.
177
Id. at 439. But see id. at 441-42 (noting, with respect to class action suits
challenging the county or state defense system, “Despite the unavailability of a federal
forum for these claims to date, it is worth noting that Luckey did create some good
law for indigent defense advocates going forward. Importantly, Luckey recognized
173

2011]

Why Misdemeanors Matter

319

more recent systemic challenges led to some “substantive, lasting
reform,”178 the current fiscal crisis has resulted in the recent rolling
back of these reforms in some jurisdictions.179 To the extent decisions
in systemic challenge cases address issues present in misdemeanor
cases, they offer some guidance for misdemeanor advocacy. However,
they do not focus on the lower criminal courts and are thus of limited
use in defining specific standards for misdemeanor representation.
Thus, there is insufficient case law to offer useful misdemeanor
guidance. The Argersinger line of cases tells judges when they must
appoint counsel, but not how that counsel must behave once
appointed. Argersinger, Scott v. Illinois, and Shelton v. Alabama all
involved challenges to uncounseled misdemeanor convictions; the
issue of effective assistance was not before the Court.180 Indeed, recent
litigation involving misdemeanors and the right to counsel continues
to focus on the fundamental question of whether the right applies,
albeit in somewhat more nuanced circumstances. For example, the
Kansas Supreme Court recently found that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction that led to jail time — and was thus
unconstitutional — could not be used for sentence enhancement
purposes in a later felony proceeding.181
By contrast, there are relatively few cases that address claims of
ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases. A search of all reported
New York state cases from 2009 until present, with the terms
“ineffective assistance of counsel” and “misdemeanor,” reveals only
twenty-two cases that involve only misdemeanor charges and analyze

that a defendant has the right to make a Sixth Amendment challenge outside the
context of post-conviction review, reasoning that the right to counsel is more than the
right to a certain result”) (citing Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (11th Cir.
1988)).
178
Id. at 444.
179
See, e.g., Dave Collins, Public Defenders Feel Squeeze Conn. Cuts Create
Caseload Worries, BOSTON.COM (July 21, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-0721/news/29798875_1_public-defenders-caseload-budget-cuts (noting how public
defender has stated that “[s]ome public defenders’ caseloads are already at or above
state guidelines set in 1999 in response to a lawsuit that said the public defender
system was so overwhelmed that it could no longer fulfill clients’ constitutional rights
to an adequate legal defense”).
180
See supra Part II. A. (discussing this troika of cases).
181
State v. Youngblood, 206 P.3d 518, 525 (Kan. 2009). Although an earlier
United States Supreme Court decision found that “an uncounseled conviction valid
under Scott may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even
though that sentence entails imprisonment,” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
746-47 (1994), the Youngblood court ruling related to a conviction that was not valid
under Scott. Youngblood, 206 P.3d at 523.

320

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:277

a claim of ineffective assistance;182 the same search in the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and all New York State federal district courts
reveals only two such cases.183 These numbers are not surprising,
because only a small percentage of individuals convicted of a
misdemeanor file an appeal or seek other post–conviction review of
counsel’s effectiveness.184 Of the twenty-four cases, seventeen relate to
one particular issue: the failure to advise a client about the deportation
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction in violation of the Sixth
Amendment duty to warn set out in the recent Supreme Court case of
Padilla v. Kentucky.185
The concentration of cases in this one specific area of misdemeanor
practice — which highlights the importance of pre-plea warnings
about collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions — is
significant.186 As discussed in Part I.B, misdemeanor convictions can
result in many severe collateral consequences, in addition to
deportation. Although Padilla itself involved a felony drug trafficking
charge, a number of lower courts have applied Padilla’s duty to warn
to misdemeanor cases involving deportation as well as other collateral
consequences.187 It is in lower-level cases — where the penal
182
Westlaw Search, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (online search for
[Misdemeanor & “ineffective assistance of counsel” and da(aft2008)], in NY-CS).
183
Westlaw Search, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (online search for
[Misdemeanor & “ineffective assistance of counsel” and da(aft 2008)], in DCTNY and
CTA2R).
184
See infra Part III.B (discussing structural impediments to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in misdemeanor cases); see also JOHN SCALIA, Federal Criminal
Appeals, 1999 with Trends 1985–1999, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT at 2-3 (Ser. No. NCJ 185055, 2001), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf (finding that, with respect to federal
court cases in 1999, “[d]efendants convicted of property, immigration, and
misdemeanor offenses were among the least likely to file an appeal,” and that
defendants filed five appeals for every 100 convictions in misdemeanor cases).
185
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (holding that where
deportation consequences of criminal conviction are “succinct, clear and explicit,”
defense counsel has Sixth Amendment obligation to correctly inform client of this
consequence).
186
This type of case in not unique to New York. See e.g., Ex parte Tanklevskaya,
No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722, at *11 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and Padilla when counsel failed to
advise client that pleading guilty to misdemeanor would have immigration
consequences).
187
See, e.g., People v. Harding, 30 Misc. 3d 1237(A), slip op. at 34 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Mar. 15, 2011) (applying Padilla framework to failure to advise about deportation
consequences); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010),
cert. granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010) (applying Padilla framework to failure to warn
about loss of pension); see also State v. Powell, 935 N.E.2d 85, 92 (Ohio Ct. App.
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consequences are not as severe — that defendants are most likely to
succeed in proving the second prong of the test: that the attorney’s
failure to warn prejudiced the defendant.188 This means demonstrating
that, given full knowledge about the collateral consequence, it is
reasonably likely there would have been a different outcome in the
case.189 Thus, although Mr. Padilla did not succeed in proving
prejudice on remand from the Supreme Court,190 some misdemeanor
defendants will be able to show how they would not have pleaded
guilty, and would have had other viable options in their case, had their
attorney properly warned them about the severe collateral
consequences of their “minor” misdemeanor charges.
As the nascent post–Padilla misdemeanor jurisprudence develops, it
will send a message to defenders that warnings about deportation, and
possibly other severe collateral consequences, are not only mandated
in all levels of cases, but that the failure to warn is most likely going to
prejudice the misdemeanor client. This means that training,
interviewing, counseling, and negotiation and sentencing advocacy in
this area are critical for misdemeanor attorneys. Indeed, the decision
in Padilla has already led to numerous trainings about its practical
application.191

2010) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel improperly advised his client
about sexual offender registration).
188
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
189
See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482; see also Roberts, supra note 137, at 698, 725
(discussing how prejudice prong’s “different outcome” requirement is broader than
showing that defendant would have chosen and won trial over guilty plea and should
instead be interpreted to allow for different outcomes based on negotiation or
sentencing advocacy that could have led to avoidance of collateral consequence).
190
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 01-CR-00517 (Hardin Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2011) (on
file with author) (holding that Padilla failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to
properly warn him about deportation consequences of his guilty plea prejudiced him).
191
See, e.g., The Fifth National Training on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP, http://defendingimmigrants.org (last
visited Mar. 12, 2011); Upcoming Trainings: The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky, PAIR
PROJECT, http://www.pairproject.org/trainings.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). For
practice advisories on Padilla, see generally IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, A DEFENDING
IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY (Apr. 2010),
available at http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/docs/2010/10-Padilla_Practice_
Advisory.pdf; DAN KESSELBRENNER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, A DEFENDING
IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: RETROACTIVE APPLICABILITY OF PADILLA V.
KENTUCKY (2010), and WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N’S IMMIGRATION PROJECT, HOW TO ADVISE
NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS: WHAT IS “CLEAR AND UNCLEAR” AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
(2010).

322

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:277

These developments in the wake of Padilla demonstrate the promise
of guidance for misdemeanor attorneys in other areas. Although this
guidance is badly needed, there are unfortunately a number of
structural and other reasons for the paucity of misdemeanor
ineffective assistance jurisprudence. Before exploring these obstacles
in Part III, the remainder of this section highlights another critical
missing piece of guidance for misdemeanor attorneys: the lack of
professional standards that address core misdemeanor issues.
2.

Lack of Misdemeanor Representation Guidance in Professional
Standards for Defense Representation

There are a number of non-constitutional sources that provide
standards for defense representation. These sources range from
published national standards to unpublished local public defender
office guidelines. They include general membership organizations,
such as the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and more specialized
groups, such as the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.192 Defense representation standards serve two main purposes:
First, they offer practical guidance to criminal defense attorneys and
serve as internal benchmarks for adequate defense representation.
Second, courts rely on professional standards to determine the
“prevailing professional norms” against which to judge an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.193 The central role that professional
standards play in guiding both practice and judicial decisions
demonstrates the importance of clear standards for misdemeanor
representation.
Margaret Colgate Love has called the ABA Criminal Justice Standards
one of the “most respected sources of criminal defense lawyers’
professional duty to the client . . . . Over the years, the Standards have
earned their place as a measure of ‘prevailing professional norms’ for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment through the thoroughness and
balance of the process by which they are developed.”194 The Criminal
192
See generally ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (noting how
the second edition of most volumes has been completed, and how a third edition is “well
underway”); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (2006) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines.
193
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citing the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards).
194
Margaret Colgate Love, Evolving Standards of Reasonableness: The ABA Standards
and the Right to Counsel in Plea Negotiations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
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Justice Standards consist of twenty-three separate sets of guidelines on
diverse topics ranging from the “Urban Police Function,” to
“Discovery.”195 In determining attorney competency under the first
Strickland prong, the Supreme Court relies more heavily on the ABA
Standards than on other professional norms; the Court has referenced
the Criminal Justice Standards’ “Defense Function” section in its
ineffective assistance analyses,196 and has also relied on the ABA’s
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases.197
The Court’s decisions in the well-developed area of ineffective
assistance in capital mitigation demonstrate an increasing reliance on
professional standards, and, more specifically, on ABA standards.198
The Court cited ABA Standards once in Williams v. Taylor, the first
Supreme Court case to actually find ineffective assistance under the
Strickland two-prong approach. Three years later, it cited ABA
standards six times in Wiggins v. Smith, and then eight times in the
2005 case of Rompilla v. Beard.199 The Court went from describing
ABA standards in Strickland as “guides to determining what is
reasonable [attorney behavior], but . . . only guides,” to characterizing
them in Wiggins as “standards to which we long have referred as
‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’ ”200 Thus, the Court
recently added structure to the purposely open-ended, deferential first
1922930.
195
See ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 192, at Standard 1 (urban
review of sentences); id. at Standard 11 (discovery); see also Warren E. Burger,
Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251
(1974); Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, 23 CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2009, at 14 (explaining how ABA Standards arise from consensus
process involving defenders, prosecutors, and judges).
196
See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (“[W]e long have referred
[to these ABA Standards] as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’ ”); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688 (describing the ABA Standards as “guides to determining what is
reasonable [attorney behavior], but . . . only guides”).
197
See, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (referring to ABA Guidelines and Standards in
determining what constitutes deficient performance). The Guidelines are not one of the
Criminal Justice Standards, but rather are separately published. See ABA, Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 913, 916 (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.
198
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (describing ineffective assistance
jurisprudence in capital mitigation context).
199
Blume & Neumann, supra note 161, at 151-52; see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at
381; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000).
200
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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prong inquiry by relying more heavily and explicitly on published
professional standards for defense practice than it had in the past.201
One could certainly attribute these developments to at least some
Justices’ increasing discomfort with and focus on the death penalty in
the years after the Williams decision. It was during this period that
Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor gave speeches voicing concerns about
the troubling state of defense representation in capital cases and the
possibility of executing innocent defendants.202 It was also during this
201
See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 (noting how in judging defense’s investigation, as
in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to
“counsel’s perspective at the time” investigative decisions are made and by giving
“heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”). There has been some
commentary that one of the Court’s recent ineffective assistance decisions
demonstrates a move away from heavy reliance on the ABA Standards in determining
prevailing professional norms. Reinstating Van Hook’s death sentence in Bobby v. Van
Hook, the Court critiqued the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the ABA’s Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which were
promulgated some 18 years after Van Hook’s sentencing proceeding. Bobby v. Van
Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009). In addition to disapproving of such prospective
application, the opinion criticized the lower court for treating the ABA Guidelines as
“inexorable commands” rather than “merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent
attorneys would do.” Id. at 17. The Court quoted liberally from its prior ineffective
assistance cases, and it is not clear that Van Hook is a step back from that
jurisprudence in terms of its reliance on the Guidelines, particularly since the opinion
was per curiam. Van Hook did, however, lead to commentary on the issue. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from the ABA,on Bobby v. Van Hook (Nov. 10, 2009), available at
http://www2.americanbar.org/DeathPenalty_migrated/RepresentationProject/PublicDo
cuments/van%20hook%20analysis.pdf (“The Court’s opinion in Van Hook does not
alter its prior jurisprudence regarding the ABA Guidelines.”); Posting of Marcia Coyle,
THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009 3:15 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2009/11/a-justices-curious-comment-about-aba-guidelines-for-death-penaltylawyers-.html (noting differing viewpoints on the meaning of Van Hook’s language
about the ABA Guidelines). One term after Van Hook, the Court cited to that
decision’s language about “inexorable commands,” but went on in the same sentence
to note how the ABA Criminal Justice Standards “may be valuable measures of the
prevailing professional norms of effective representation,” and then relied heavily on
various professional standards in its analysis. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1482 (2010).
202
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 1, 10 (2001) (noting, in remarks at Access to
Justice conference, how she has “yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to
the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well
represented at trial”); Crystal Nix Hines, Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A1 (noting Justice O’Connor’s comment, in speech
to Minnesota Women Lawyers, that “[p]erhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards
for appointed counsel in death cases”). It was also during this period that the Court
held unconstitutional the execution of an individual for a crime committed when
under the age of 18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
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period that the ABA updated its Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.203
However, a narrative that explains the Court’s more robust
ineffective assistance jurisprudence and heavier reliance on the ABA’s
Standards and Guidelines as a concern solely with capital cases has two
limitations. First, although such concerns may well have animated the
Court, the Court did not limit its recent ineffective assistance
jurisprudence to the capital context — a move the Court certainly
could have taken given that the cases all involved capital mitigation
review. Indeed, as early as Strickland, the Court noted how “[a] capital
sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case . . . is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision that counsel’s role in the proceeding is
comparable to counsel’s role at trial.”204 The applicability of the
Court’s ineffective assistance norms to non-death cases — and indeed
to misdemeanors205 — is thus clear. The second limitation to a
narrative that explains the Court’s interest in ineffective assistance as
an interest in capital cases is that the Court found ineffective
assistance for failure to warn about deportation consequences in
Padilla, which involved a felony marijuana trafficking case where
Padilla had already served his sentence by the time the Court reviewed
the case.206 The Court began its exploration of defense counsel’s Sixth
Amendment duty to warn by noting how the ABA Standards “may be
valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective
representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal
with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and
immigration law.”207 The decision then went far beyond the Court’s
more recent singular focus on the ABA Standards in its exploration of
professional norms and cited a number of other standards to support
its statement that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms
supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the

203
See ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 913 (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_
representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.
204
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (internal citations omitted) (explaining how,
“[f]or purposes of describing counsel’s duties, therefore, Florida’s capital sentencing
proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial”).
205
See supra notes 157-59 (discussing Strickland test’s application to
misdemeanors).
206
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
207
Id. at 1482.
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risk of deportation.”208 These other sources included the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association’s Performance Guidelines for
Criminal Representation, the Department of Justice’s Compendium of
Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, various criminal law and
practice treatises, and law review articles.209 In the 2011-2012 term,
the Court will decide two more non-capital claims of ineffective
assistance, Missouri v. Frye, and Lafler v. Cooper. The former involves a
felony charge of driving with revoked driving privileges, and the latter
involves assault with intent to murder.210 These recent and upcoming
cases demonstrate the Court’s interest in professional standards for
effective representation in non-capital cases,211 and the importance of
having standards for misdemeanor practice.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s emphatic reliance on
professional standards in recent ineffective assistance jurisprudence,
an institutional defender office or an attorney new to criminal practice
might reasonably turn to published professional standards for
guidance on representation in misdemeanor cases.212 That attorney
will find different defender caseload recommendations for felonies and
misdemeanors.213 That attorney may also find different levels of
208

Id.
Id.
210
Lafler v. Cooper, 376 F. App’x 563, 565-66(6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 856 (2011) (No. 10-209); Missouri v. Frye, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011) (No. 10-444).
211
These cases also demonstrate what Professor Stephanos Bibas has described as
“a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains.” Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea Bargain Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011). Bibas notes how the Padilla decision marked the
moment when “[t]he Court began to move beyond its fixation upon the handful of
cases that go to jury trials. It recognized that the other 95 percent of adjudicated cases
resolved by guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest to regulate plea bargains
the way it has long regulated jury trials.” Id. at 1118-19. But see Josh Bowers,
Fundamental Fairness and the Path From Santobello to Padilla: A Response to Professor
Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 53 (2011) (disagreeing with Bibas’s characterization
of Padilla as “watershed” decision, and describing how “the Court has regulated plea
bargaining on its own terms for decades,” using fundamental fairness approach rather
than “accuracy” approach it uses when regulating trials). The Court’s willingness to
delve so deeply into the messy area of plea bargain regulation--and in particular into
counseling about collateral consequences of guilty pleas--will surely affect
misdemeanor practice; indeed, that is already the case with Padilla, which did not
limit the duty to warn about deportation to felony cases. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
212
See Blume & Neumann, supra note 161, at 147 (“The jurisprudential shift is
now evident and established. Lower courts must consider the ABA Guidelines and
other national standards to determine the reasonableness of counsel’s behavior in light
of prevailing professional norms as part of ineffective counsel analysis.”).
213
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting how nationally recognized
209
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compensation for felony and misdemeanor representation in her
jurisdiction,214 which suggests different expectations for felony and
misdemeanor representation. However, that attorney will not find
guidance in professional standards on the meaning of any such
differing expectations. For example, the ABA endorses caseload caps
of 300 for non-traffic misdemeanors and 150 for felonies, but does not
explain what misdemeanor lawyers are expected to cut or do
differently in their representation to handle a caseload that is double
that recommended for felony attorneys.215 Thus, the widely-cited ABA
Criminal Justice Standards do not offer any separate guidelines for
misdemeanors.
The Criminal Justice Standards do recognize, in various provisions
and commentary, some of the differences between misdemeanor and
felony cases. However, these references are largely in relation to the
baseline issue of whether there is a right to counsel at all under the
Sixth Amendment.216 One such discussion is located in the “Guilty
Pleas” Standard relating to “[a]id of counsel; time for deliberation.”217
This Standard first states that a defendant should have reasonable time
to consult with an attorney before entering a guilty plea. The second
part of the Standard states that a defendant who chooses to waive
counsel should have “a reasonable time for deliberation” about a guilty
plea before it is accepted by the court, and after certain judicial
advisement.218 Although there is no misdemeanor-felony distinction in
the text of this “aid of counsel” Standard, the commentary recognizes

standards are 400 non-traffic misdemeanors per year, with number dropping to 150
for felonies).
214
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (2011) (setting hourly rates and noting that
payment “shall not exceed $7,000 for each attorney in a case in which one or more
felonies are charged, and $2,000 for each attorney in a case in which only
misdemeanors are charged”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.125 (2001) (setting capital
and non-capital case hourly rates and capping felony or “gross misdemeanor”
representation at $2,500 and misdemeanor representation at $750).
215
See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, supra note 77, at
pt. 4 (stating that ABA endorses National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) caseload
numbers, although list following endorsement notes misdemeanor cap of 300, rather
than 400 as NAC recommends).
216
See, e.g., ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed.
1992) (search reveals 19 mentions of “misdemeanor,” most relating to this baseline
issue).
217
See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 67, at § 14-1.3.
218
Id. This time for deliberation would come after advice by the court, spelled out
in another guideline, which relates to such things as maximum sentence, the waiver of
certain constitutional rights, and advisement about certain collateral consequences of
a criminal conviction. See id. at § 14-1.4.
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how this provision might work differently if the charge is a
misdemeanor where the defendant does not have a right to an
attorney.219
The Commentary to the Criminal Justice Standards better accounts
for the reality of the lower courts, by noting how the “time for
deliberation” standard purposefully did not include a specific time
period. The Commentary thus explains that set time periods would
introduce “an undesirable degree of rigidity by requiring two initial
court appearances even in those cases, such as misdemeanor traffic
offenses, in which a defendant might wish to enter a plea immediately
rather than being required to return to the jurisdiction for a second
appearance.”220 Certainly, this commentary recognizes and advances a
system where low-level offenses are treated differently from offenses
carrying a greater potential criminal penalty.
Other “misdemeanor” mentions in the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards are passing illustrative examples that just happen to be
misdemeanor cases, but are not related to the question of effective
assistance for misdemeanors.221 There are general standards that, if
applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies, would significantly raise
the level of practice. For example, one Standard states that “[d]efense
counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits
of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.”222 To be sure, it
is an unfortunate reality that this thorough investigation often does
not take place in felony cases.223 However, investigation is impossible
in misdemeanor cases that are resolved by guilty plea shortly after a
219

Id. (“[I]t would impose a significant burden on the courts to require that all
defendants be represented by counsel in order to plead guilty, even in misdemeanor
cases involving no prison sentence.”).
220
Id. (“[I]n most cases, as a practical matter, the proceedings required to ensure
that the defendant has properly waived counsel will necessitate a delay between the
initial court appearance and the entry of a plea.”).
221
See, e.g., id. § 14-1.8(a)(ii) (illustrating proper consideration of guilty plea in
final disposition approval, for court allowing misdemeanor guilty plea in exchange for
dismissal of felony charges in order “to avoid the stigma-and some or all of the
collateral consequences-of a felony conviction”).
222
See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-4.1. (3d ed. 1993).
223
See, e.g., Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying
ineffective assistance claim despite description of defense counsel’s investigation in
capital case as extremely limited); Jane Fritsch & Matthew Purdy, Defenders by
Default: A Special Report; Option to Legal Aid for Poor Leaves New Yorkers at Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1994, at A1 (noting examples where court-appointed attorneys have
failed to investigate their clients’ cases).
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defendant meets his counsel at the first appearance, as many cases are
in some jurisdictions.224 The same is true when a defender has a high
misdemeanor caseload, or when office investigative resources are not
available for misdemeanors.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards acknowledge that misdemeanors
are constitutionally different from felonies in terms of the attachment
of the right to counsel.225 However, the Standards do not address the
ways in which defense counsel might effectively represent
misdemeanor clients, given the particular needs and challenges of
misdemeanor representation, when the right to counsel applies. There
is a similar lack of guidance in other standards, such as the National
Legal Aid & Defender Association’s Performance Guidelines for
Criminal Defense Representation, which do not contain the word
“misdemeanor.”226 The current lack of guidance from professional
standards can lead to one of three conclusions: the system must
change to allow defense counsel in misdemeanors to adhere to existing
professional standards; there must be new standards designed to
address a misdemeanor-specific context; or perhaps some combination
of these two potential responses.227
III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES IN RESPONDING TO THE NEED FOR
MISDEMEANOR STANDARDS
The academic and practice communities have not paid sufficient
attention to the significance of a misdemeanor charge or conviction, or
to the importance of defining and ensuring quality representation in
these seemingly petty cases. Yet as demonstrated in Part I,
224
See, e.g., THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15 (“Almost 70% of defendants
observed entered a guilty or no contest plea at arraignment.”). In some jurisdictions
there is no counsel at the initial arraignment or counsel is present only for the
arraignment and the case is then re-assigned. In these jurisdictions, even if there is no
guilty plea until the appearance after arraignment, there is simply no real opportunity
for defense counsel — who is appearing on the case and often meeting her client for
the first time – to investigate the facts of the case.
225
See supra notes 216-19.
226
See PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 192 (searching for “misdemeanor”
shows zero results, and guidelines do not separate “serious” from “less serious” crimes
or use any similar categorization).
227
Some jurisdictions have requirements for capital cases and programs to assign
“qualified” capital counsel. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
“Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 489-90 (1993) (listing
examples); see also id. at 495, nn.247-50 (noting there are legal standards on capital
trial issues applying specifically to that context, including death qualification, jury
instructions, and bifurcation of guilt and punishment); supra note 203 and
accompanying text (noting that ABA has a separate set of standards for capital cases).
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misdemeanors matter. Once proper consideration is given to this
overlooked area of criminal law and procedure, a variety of questions
flow. They include the core issues of what can be done and who can
do what. This Part explores potential divisions of labor among the
various institutions connected to the criminal justice system in
addressing the specialized needs of misdemeanor defendants. Who can
act to fill the void for standards of misdemeanor representation, given
particular institutional competencies? The legislature, judiciary,
professional organizations, and the defense bar are all well-situated to
effectuate different, important changes. Although this Article does not
attempt to fully answer the complex question of what those
institutions might do, this Part does address some of the ways in
which each group might react to the crisis in misdemeanor
representation and the lack of standards.
Part A considers the legislative role in easing the crisis by moving
certain truly low-level misdemeanors out of the criminal justice
system entirely, and notes how this is an opportune moment for
undertaking such cost-saving reforms. Part B describes the important
role that courts play in advancing a discussion of and potential
solutions to inadequate representation in the nation’s lower courts.
While there are numerous structural obstacles to courts articulating
constitutional standards for effective assistance of counsel in
misdemeanor cases, these obstacles are not a total bar to such a
misdemeanor jurisprudence. Equally important as the articulation of
constitutional standards is the role of the courts as provocateurs, in
spurring discussion about reform. Part C is a call to professional
organizations, including the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards project,
to consider the particular context of misdemeanor representation.
While there is no bright line between felony and misdemeanor
representation,228 there are already separate national caseload
suggestions and separate levels of compensation in many jurisdictions
for the two categories of cases. Professional organizations should
either promulgate misdemeanor-specific standards for representation
or clarify that general standards apply equally to felonies and
misdemeanors, with commentary addressing how those standards
might be met in the different contexts. Finally, Part D describes the
role the defender community might play in shaping misdemeanor
standards. While there are unfortunately many fronts on which the
defender community might begin to address the misdemeanor
representation crisis, Part D focuses on two areas in particular need of

228

See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
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attention: training in the identification and use — in client counseling,
negotiation and sentencing advocacy — of collateral consequences;
and lowering the high rates of waiver of the right to counsel in the
lower criminal courts.
A. The Legislative Role: Moving Minor Misdemeanors Out of the
Criminal Justice System
In an open letter to the California State Senate, then-Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger explained why he was signing a bill changing
the act of possessing less than one ounce of marijuana from a
misdemeanor to a civil infraction that did not allow for arrest or
criminal prosecution:
In this time of drastic budget cuts, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, law enforcement, and the courts cannot afford to
expend limited resources prosecuting a crime that carries the
same punishment as a traffic ticket. As noted by the Judicial
Council in its support of this measure, the appointment of
counsel and the availability of a jury trial should be reserved
for defendants who are facing loss of life, liberty, or property
greater than $100.229
In 2009, the year before California passed this new law, more than
60,000 individuals passed through the criminal justice system on
minor marijuana possession charges.230 In Massachusetts, the move of
minor marijuana possession from the criminal justice system to the
civil infraction system came by way of voter ballot initiative.231 A
similar move is under consideration in Hawaii.232 Driven by the stark
229
Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., to the Members of the
Cal. State Senate (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.salemnews.com/articles/october012010/schwarzenegger-marijuana.php. Under previous
California law, possession of such small amounts of marijuana was only punishable by
fine, but processed in criminal court. The new law took such cases out of criminal
courts, and made possession of less than one ounce a civil offense. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2010). Voters later disapproved — by a margin of 54% to
46%—a ballot measure fully decriminalizing marijuana possession under California
law, see Miguel Helft, Election Results 2010: California, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/california?scp=3&sq=hawaii%20marijuana%
20&st=cse, although the new state law already did much of the work of that ballot
measure by moving such cases into the civil system.
230
See Table 4a: Total Misdemeanor Arrests, CAL. STATE DEP’T JUST., (2009),
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/00/4A.htm.
231
See Abel, supra note 108, at B6.
232
See Senate Approves Marijuana Decriminalization, HAW. REP. (Mar. 8, 2011),
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fiscal reality of the high costs of low-level prosecutions in hard
economic times, other states and localities have also moved certain
misdemeanors out of the costly criminal justice system. For example,
keeping the misdemeanor of driving with a suspended license out of
the criminal justice system offers significant costs savings. A recent
national report noted how “driving offenses, particularly the offenses
equivalent to driving with a suspended license, make up an
extraordinary proportion of the misdemeanor caseloads in many
jurisdictions.”233 In addition, “Most of these [driving while suspended]
charges result from the failure to pay fines or fees, such as tickets for a
broken tail light or not having insurance, parking tickets, or even
failure to pay child support.”234 In one Washington county, of the
twenty-nine misdemeanor cases heard on a single day, 41% were
charges of driving with a suspended license.235 The unnecessarily large
amount of criminal justice resources that many jurisdictions devote to
such cases has led to some creative solutions. In King County,
Washington, the prosecutor, defender office, lower court, county
executive, and county council worked together to keep such driving
cases out of the criminal justice system. The program they created
allowed individuals to work off the underlying fine that led to the
suspension in exchange for dismissal of the criminal charges. A study
of the early months of the program showed a reduction of 84% in
prosecutorial filings in suspension cases, and a reduction of 24% in jail
costs.236
The potential savings from such diversion and decriminalization is
enormous. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics for 2009 show
that more than 45% of all drug arrests in the United States were for
marijuana possession.237 In that same year, “there were 8,067 gambling
arrests, 26,380 vagrancy arrests, 471,727 drunkenness arrests, 518,374
disorderly conduct arrests, and 89,733 curfew and loitering arrests.”238
If significant numbers of these low-level misdemeanors are moved out
http://www.hawaiireporter.com/senate-approves-marijuana-decriminalization/123
(describing how bill to reduce possession of small amounts of marijuana to civil
infraction passed Senate and was sent to the House of Representatives).
233
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 28.
234
Id. at 26.
235
Id. at 25.
236
Id. at 28.
237
See DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS, supra note 69, at 1-3; see also
id. at 1 (“In some courts, the combination of [the three misdemeanors of] driving with
a suspended license, possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of alcohol cases
can total between 40% and 50% of the caseload.”).
238
Id. at 3.
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of the criminal justice system, there is potential for better levels of
representation in those misdemeanor cases that remain. However,
such potential can only be realized if decriminalization does not imply
cuts to public defense budgets on the theory that less funding is
needed due to fewer cases in the system. States and localities should
see this as an opportunity to save money in some parts of the system
— lower court and jail costs — with a concomitant opportunity to
focus defense resources on the many individuals still facing
misdemeanor charges.
Raising the bar on misdemeanor representation through such
reforms as workload caps, avoiding guilty pleas at first appearances,
and more investigative resources undoubtedly requires additional
resources, or at least the reallocation of existing resources. However,
there are significant long-term cost savings when higher quality
representation leads to fewer wrongful convictions, unnecessary
collateral consequences, and unnecessary incarceration.239 Despite
some limited inroads to move some low-level offenses to diversion
programs or the civil justice system, legislators’ perceived need to be
“tough on crime,” as well as their belief that any concession in the
criminal justice realm will be seen as “weak,” makes decriminalization
an unlikely route for true reform of misdemeanor representation.240
The bottom line is if jurisdictions want to continue to prosecute
misdemeanor offenses in great number, then they must find a way to
provide for effective assistance of counsel in these cases. Otherwise
defenders are put in a position where they are unable to fulfill their
constitutional, professional, and ethical duties to provide adequate
assistance to clients charged with misdemeanor crimes.
The real and perceived obstacles to legislative change highlight the
need for judicial reform. The next section discusses the important role
that courts have to play in advancing standards for adequate
representation in the nation’s lower courts.
B. The Role of Courts as Provocateurs
Numerous scholars have described the critical dialogue that occurs
between different institutions in shaping constitutional norms.241
239

See generally MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12 (describing high
costs that deficient representation on misdemeanors may have on indigent defendants
and their communities).
240
See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719
(2005) (“Conventional wisdom suggests that appearing tough on crime wins
elections.”).
241
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
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Professor Erik Luna has examined one facet of that dialogue — that of
courts providing “constitutional road maps” to legislatures, in the
context of criminal justice jurisprudence.242 An example of such road
mapping can be seen in City of Chicago v. Morales, where the Supreme
Court struck down a city ordinance “prohibit[ing] ‘criminal street
gang members’ from ‘loitering’ with one another or with other persons
in any public place.”243 As Luna notes, “Despite agreeing that the gangloitering ordinance was unconstitutional, [Justice] O’Connor
suggested that Chicago had lawful alternatives at its disposal. Her
concurrence then sketched out potential statutory provisions that
would survive judicial scrutiny, offering a constitutional road map for
lawmakers to follow in reenacting the ordinance.”244
There is a similar road mapping role for courts to play in answering
the misdemeanor representation crisis and addressing the need for
misdemeanor standards of representation. Professor William Stuntz
outlined one such potential road map relating to adequate funding for
indigent defense, noting how “ensuring an adequate quantity of
representation . . . is an achievable goal — and raising quantity tends
to raise quality as well.”245 Recognizing the problem of judges
essentially setting budget lines to mandate adequate funding, Stuntz
instead proposed a system of “penalty defaults” under which:
[I]n all jurisdictions that set up expert commissions to
recommend appropriate funding for indigent criminal defense
and then follow those recommendations, ineffective assistance
doctrine will not apply. Elsewhere, ineffective assistance
standards will be ratcheted up sharply. If this default rule
applied, state legislators would have an incentive to establish
sensible processes for fixing defense budgets, and room to
experiment with different funding patterns — more money for
defense lawyers in some jurisdictions, more money for
investigators or defense crime labs in others.246
Although this is just one example of a potential road map for
legislatures, there are a number of areas relating to misdemeanor
1125, 1173-85 (2000) (providing “an overview of the leading theories of interbranch
dialogue”).
242
Id.
243
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1999).
244
Luna, supra note 241, at 1128.
245
William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 837 (2006).
246
Id.
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representation in which courts might provoke legislatures and
professional organizations to set standards. One such area is caseloads,
with some defenders recently refusing to take new cases because of
high caseloads, and states passing or considering caseload caps.247
Here, courts could rely on national or local caseload recommendations
in examining individual or systemic claims of ineffective assistance.248
For example, if an individual claimed ineffective assistance based on
counsel’s failure to meet him prior to a trial appearance, the court
might examine the caseload of the defender at the time of the
individual’s representation and apply a rebuttable presumption of
ineffectiveness if caseload numbers exceeded recommended standards.
A few courts have already used such rebuttable presumptions in cases
challenging the constitutionality of an indigent defender system.249
These examples illustrate the interconnected nature of any
discussion about adequate standards for misdemeanor representation.
There are different institutional competencies, and thus different
potential responses, that courts, legislatures, defender offices,
professional organizations, and others might bring to the
misdemeanor representation crisis and the lack of standards. However,
there must also be dialogue between those who fund criminal defense,
examine its adequacy, write aspirational standards, and carry out the
actual representation.
This Section focuses on the judiciary’s role in defining the
constitutional right to misdemeanor effective assistance of counsel.
Courts face numerous structural obstacles to review of misdemeanor
ineffective assistance claims, and this section first offers suggestions
for reform to allow development of such a misdemeanor
jurisprudence. The Section then considers issues courts will encounter
in reviewing misdemeanor ineffective assistance claims. In ineffective
assistance analyses, courts rely on three factors to determine if defense
counsel offered deficient representation in violation of Strickland’s first
prong: (1) prevailing professional standards; (2) the norms of practice
at the time and place of the representation at issue; and (3) court
decisions applying these first two factors to a particular factual

247

See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
249
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that excessive
caseloads of defenders lead to due process and right-to-counsel violations); State v.
Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel because
attorney’s excessive caseloads prevented adequate representation); see also supra notes
176-79 and accompanying text.
248
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context, thus giving content to application of the norms.250 As Part
II.B.2 reviews, prevailing professional standards such as the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards offer insufficient guidance for misdemeanor
representation for the first factor. Part II.B.1 also notes how there are
few cases to provide content from the third factor. The second factor
— practice norms at the time and place of the representation — poses
a troubling issue for courts considering ineffective assistance claims:
should constitutional attorney competence standards be driven by
potentially low standards of practice in particular jurisdictions? The
last part of this Section thus considers the many pitfalls and certain
benefits of incorporating local practice norms and resource
deprivation into the constitutional definition of ineffective assistance.
1.

Structural Impediments to Development of Misdemeanor
Ineffective Assistance Jurisprudence and Suggestions for Reform

Supreme Court precedent “make[s] clear that one searching for the
content of the reasonably effective assistance standard must look
primarily to judicial decisions applying that standard.”251 For example,
Padilla v. Kentucky addressed the right to effective assistance in the
area of client counseling about collateral consequences, and Wiggins v.
Smith informed attorneys that effective assistance includes the duty to
investigate mitigation evidence in capital cases.252 In areas that the
Supreme Court has not directly examined, lower court decisions
might provide this content,253 giving meaning to Strickland’s purposely
vague and deferential standard of providing reasonably effective
assistance of counsel.254

250

See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (considering prevailing
professional standards, local practice, and prior capital mitigation precedent in
granting claim of ineffective assistance in capital case).
251
LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 664 (referring to Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
252
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 U.S. 1473, 1485 (2010); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524;
see also supra notes 166, 191 and accompanying text (discussing trainings in wake of
Padilla and Wiggins).
253
See, e.g., Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel where lawyer failed to counsel defendant “that, although he
never even suggested such a thought to the petitioner, it was [defense counsel’s] own
view that his client’s decision to reject the plea bargain was suicidal”).
254
See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing need for deference in
determining attorney competence); supra Part II.B.2.
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Structural Impediments

In order for courts to provide the factual context that gives content
to the vague ineffective assistance test, misdemeanor cases must work
their way up the appellate ladder. However, not many misdemeanor
cases make their way up this ladder, so that there is little opportunity
for courts to apply general ineffective assistance norms to
misdemeanor-specific facts.255 There are a number of reasons for the
lack of appellate review in misdemeanor cases.
Perhaps the main reason courts fail to review misdemeanor cases is
that the vast majority of misdemeanor convictions come after a guilty
plea. For example, in New York City in 2003, less than one-third of
1% of misdemeanor convictions resulted from a trial verdict.256 In
addition, individuals who plead guilty in the fast-paced, high-volume
lower criminal courts may not even be aware of the right to appeal, or
of the need to file a notice of appeal within a short time period after
conviction.257 Even if a defendant is aware of the right to appeal,
prosecutors sometimes insist on a waiver of the right as part of any
plea bargain.258 Individuals who get past these obstacles will have long
255

See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 184, at 2-3 (noting that in 1999, there were only five
appeals for every 100 misdemeanor convictions in federal courts).
256
See Zeidman, supra note 26, at 321, n.35; see also OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN.,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY 48 (2009) (finding that only 1% of county
court cases, which are predominantly misdemeanors, proceed to trial). This trend is
not exclusive to misdemeanors. Percentages of felony prosecutions that end in a trial
verdict have gone down from already low levels over the past few decades. See Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409,
1415-16 (2003) (noting that while by 2003 some states’ federal plea rates had
increased over the past decade to 99.0%, national federal trial rate was only 3.4% and
decreasing).
257
See OR. REV. STAT. § 138.071 (2011) (defendant must file notice of appeal
within thirty days after judgment entered). A recent report on the state of indigent
defense in Florida’s lower courts noted how “[a]fter sentencing at arraignment, only
23.7% of defendants were advised of their right to an appeal, and only 23.2% the right
to an attorney for that appeal. In-custody defendants were less likely to be advised of
their right to appeal than released defendants.” See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note
1, at 19. These troublingly low percentages were observed despite a Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure requiring trial judges to inform defendants of their right to
appeal. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.670.
258
See, e.g., United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An
appellate waiver will be enforced if: (1) its terms are clear and unambiguous; and (2)
the record demonstrates that it was entered into ‘knowingly and voluntarily.’ ”). Such
a waiver does not automatically foreclose a later claim of ineffective assistance. See,
e.g., Costin v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (D. Conn. 2008) (“[A] waiver is
unenforceable if petitioner can prove that, because her counsel’s advice was
ineffective, her waiver was not knowing and voluntary.”). However, courts allowing
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finished any sentence by the time any appeal would be heard, thus
undercutting the immediate incentive to revisit the underlying
conviction.
In addition, any direct appeal of a misdemeanor conviction will
rarely include consideration of an ineffective assistance claim. Direct
appeal is limited to review of the trial court record, which often does
not contain evidence of the alleged incompetence of defense counsel,
particularly if the conviction came after a guilty plea.259 Thus, “almost
all jurisdictions prefer that ineffective assistance claims be presented
on collateral attack,”260 where the petitioner can develop a factual
record through the petition and any evidentiary hearings. In short, a
defendant has to get past direct appeal — where few misdemeanors go
to begin with — and then develop a record on collateral review.261
The first opportunity for most individuals convicted of a
misdemeanor to raise an ineffective assistance claim is through a
petition for post–conviction relief. Statutory and judicially created

such a claim to go forward may narrowly circumscribe the scope of review. See Parisi
v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in analyzing ineffective
assistance claim where defendant waived right to appeal, court may only consider
process by which defendant agreed to plead guilty and thus may not consider any preplea events). In addition, once a defendant waives the right to appeal, and there is no
attorney assigned to handle the appeal, it is highly unlikely that anyone will review
the case to determine if there is a viable ineffectiveness claim. It is also unlikely that
the defendant will file the requisite notice of intention to appeal. See, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 138.071 (2003) (defendant must file notice of appeal within 30 days after
judgment entered).
259
In many jurisdictions the same lawyer or organization that handled the trial will
handle the appeal, and that person or group is “unlikely to look to their own
ineptitude in developing grounds for appeal.” KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 143 (12th ed. 2008). An even more basic obstacle is that “a large number
of misdemeanor convictions take place in police or justice courts which are not courts
of record. Without a drastic change in the procedures of these courts, there would be
no way” for the defendant to demonstrate error in the original proceeding or
reconstruct evidence lost in the intervening period. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 748 (1994).
260
See KAMISAR, supra note 259, at 142; see also United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d
1149, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e will not remand a case from direct appeal for
fact-finding related to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but allow a defendant
to pursue the issue in district court collateral proceedings.”) (citing United States v.
Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)).
261
See LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 1333 (“Every jurisdiction has one or more
procedures through which defendants can present post-appeal challenges to their
convictions and sentences on at least limited grounds. In addition, through the federal
writ of habeas corpus, a state defendant may challenge his state conviction on federal
constitutional grounds in the federal courts. These procedures for presenting postappeals challenges are commonly described as ‘collateral remedies.’ ”).
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impediments to post–conviction relief are extensive. The list is too
long to document here, but a few examples suffice to understand why
one commentator recently noted that “[a]t enormous expense, the
system grants relief to almost nobody.”262 First, there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel on post–conviction review, so many
petitioners proceed pro se.263 Second, both federal and state habeas
courts have numerous opportunities to find procedural default, such
as for a petitioner’s failure to raise an issue in an earlier proceeding.264
Third, the federal habeas corpus statute as well as twenty-four state
habeas statutes or rules have a jurisdictional prerequisite that an
individual filing a petition be “in custody.”265 Courts have found
custody where the individual seeking federal habeas review is
imprisoned for the conviction, on parole or probation, serving a
suspended sentence, or under court-ordered treatment in the
community.266 A person seeking post–conviction relief from a

262
Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4
(2010) (referring to federal habeas corpus review); see also id. at 9-12 (providing an
excellent explanation of myriad bars to federal habeas corpus relief).
263
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks
upon their convictions and we decline to so hold today.”). Some states grant postconviction counsel through statute, court rule, or at the court’s discretion, although in
other jurisdictions the right is limited to death-sentenced defendants. See Thomas M.
Place, Deferring Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral Review: Ensuring Equal Access and a
Right to Appoint Counsel, 98 KY. L.J. 301, 326 (2010) (noting that “majority of states
appoint counsel in collateral proceedings in non-capital cases and thirty-three states
provide counsel in capital cases.”); see also Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A
Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 app. A (2002) (providing chart breaking down how, as of 2002, 34
states discretionarily provided post-conviction counsel, 13 states guaranteed it, and 3
states did not provide for post-conviction counsel).
264
See, e.g., Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
procedural default on federal habeas corpus because defendant failed to raise
ineffective assistance claim in earlier state post-conviction proceeding, even while
acknowledging that post-conviction counsel may have been ineffective for so failing to
raise that claim). While there is no such state exhaustion requirement for individuals
convicted in federal court, the overwhelming majority of convictions come out of the
state courts. See Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 2004, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1 (Ser. No.
NCJ 215646, 2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf
(noting how in 2004, “94% of felony convictions occurred in State courts, remaining
6% in Federal courts”).
265
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2010) (federal habeas statute); Place, supra note 263,
at 327 n.203 (listing state statutes and court rules).
266
See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV.
147, 153 (2000) (citing cases).
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misdemeanor conviction will be long free of such restraints. Although
the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the question of
whether severe collateral consequences (such as deportation)
sufficiently restrain liberty to constitute custody, language in related
decisions “strongly suggests that such collateral effects would be
insufficient.”267 Given these obstacles, it is not surprising that a recent
study of federal habeas corpus litigation in the United States District
Courts found, in a sample of 1,512 non-capital cases, only “[f]ive . . .
had a misdemeanor as the most serious offense of conviction.”268
In the end, the prospects are stark even for those few petitioners
able to pick through the minefield of impediments to review of an
ineffective assistance claim; in non-capital federal habeas petitions,
judges grant relief in less than 1% of cases.269 These obstacles are a
central reason that one of the three sources for ineffective assistance
norms270 — guidance from judicial decisions — is underdeveloped and
adds to the problem of a virtually non-existent jurisprudence of
misdemeanor ineffective assistance.
b.

Suggestions for Avoidance of Structural Impediments, and Reform

There are several ways for courts and litigants to avoid obstacles to
the development of a body of law on misdemeanor ineffective
assistance. One possibility is for state and federal courts to include
267

Yale L. Rosenberg, The Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Liberal Oasis or
Conservative Prop, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 99, 115 n.111 (1995) (discussing Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491
(1989) (“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the
collateral consequences of that conviction are not in themselves sufficient to render an
individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.”). But see infra text
accompanying notes 271-74, arguing that courts deciding whether severe collateral
consequences satisfy the “in custody” requirement should interpret the requirement
liberally, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent Padilla decision.
268
NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 20 (2007), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
269
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 809 (2009); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1989) (“Federal habeas courts granted relief in only 0.25% to 7% of
noncapital cases in recent years.”). In addition, as explored above there are fewer trials
in misdemeanor cases, and “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.
But they account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 U.S. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36-38 (1994)).
270
The other two sources being prevailing professional norms and local practice.
See supra text accompanying note 250 (describing three factors that inform analysis of
alleged attorney deficiencies).
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severe collateral consequences in their interpretation of the state or
federal habeas statutes’ ”in custody” requirement. This would be
timely given the current era of growing and high stakes collateral
consequences,271 and the Supreme Court’s decision establishing a
defendant’s right to information about deportation before any guilty
plea in the wake of Padilla v. Kentucky.272 Padilla is notable for Justice
Stevens’s discussion of the severe effect that deportation can have on
an individual’s life, and the Court’s “view that, as a matter of federal
law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most
important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on non-citizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”273 As a number of
courts and commentators have noted in the wake of Padilla, surely
other consequences are equally severe for some defendants and thus
similarly integral to the criminal penalty.274 A broader interpretation of
the “in custody” requirement would open up this avenue to
consideration of claims of ineffective assistance where defense counsel
failed to warn about deportation or other severe collateral
consequences.
Alternatively, courts might follow the Third Circuit’s example in its
recent approval of the federal writ of coram nobis as an avenue of relief
for individuals no longer “in custody” and thus unable to access
federal habeas corpus relief.275 In United States v. Orocio, Gerald
Orocio pled guilty in federal court to simple possession of a controlled
substance in exchange for a sentence of time served plus two years of
supervised probation after turning down an earlier offer to plead guilty
to drug trafficking with a ten-year sentence. After completing his
probation, Orocio received notice that the government had initiated
removal proceedings to send him back to his birth country of the
Philippines.276 The Third Circuit granted Orocio’s petition for relief
based on counsel’s failure to warn him about the deportation
consequence of his plea, noting how the federal writ of error coram
nobis “is used to attack allegedly invalid convictions which have
continuing consequences, when the petitioner has served his sentence

271

See supra Part I.B.
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
273
Id. at 1480.
274
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying
Padilla’s duty to warn to consequence of sex offender registration); see also Love,
supra note 90, at 24-25.
275
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 635 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989).
276
Id. at 634.
272
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and is no longer ‘in custody’ for purposes of [the federal habeas corpus
statute].”277
Some jurisdictions allow state coram nobis review for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that cannot otherwise be litigated,278 while
others have effectively closed it as an avenue for such review.279 At
least one state court has allowed use of the writ in the context of a
misdemeanor conviction.280 Just as courts should ease the “in custody”
requirement to allow for state and federal habeas claims, courts should
allow more liberal use of the writ of coram nobis to generate critical
jurisprudential development of misdemeanor effective assistance.
More ambitious solutions can be found in the recent scholarly
literature condemning the current highly restrictive and wasteful state
of federal and state habeas corpus. Proposing a practical solution to
two related criminal procedure problems, Professor Eve Brensike
Primus has called for the “relocation” of ineffective assistance claims
from post–conviction review to direct appeal.281 The first problems she
identifies are the structural impediments discussed above. Second,
Primus describes the waste of resources during direct review of
criminal convictions, where the defendant has a constitutional right to
counsel and, therefore, where public funds for a largely indigent

277
Id. at 647 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2011) (empowering federal court,
under All Writs Act, to issue writ of error coram nobis); Hirabayashi v. United States,
828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that coram nobis “petitioner must show the
following to qualify for coram nobis relief: (1) a more usual remedy is not available;
(2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character”);
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).
278
See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 525 So. 2d 820, 830 (Ala. 1985) (“Coram nobis,
therefore, can now be used to raise claims of inadequate assistance of counsel”).
279
See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 77 Cal. App. 4th 971, 987 (Ct. App. 2000) (“A
claim that the defendant was deprived of effective representation of counsel is not an
appropriate basis for relief by writ of coram nobis.”); Commonwealth v. Morris,
092346, 2011 WL 111692, at *5 (Va. 2011) (“[A] claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel does not constitute an error of fact for which coram nobis will lie . . . because
such a claim would not ‘have prevented rendition of the judgment.’ ”).
280
See Dequesada v. State, 444 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Unfortunately, Desquesada’s review of the merits of the underlying ineffective
assistance claim was limited to one sentence, thus failing to advance that jurisdiction’s
norms for such representation. See id. at 576-77 (“[R]eview of Desquesada’s
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as a perusal of the attached
affidavits and portions of the trial transcript which he submitted . . . shows that the
allegations are substantively insufficient”).
281
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 731 (2007).
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population are directed. The waste comes from the inability of
appellate attorneys to raise issues on direct review that the trial
attorney failed to preserve, so that “public defenders routinely spend
their time arguing frivolous appeals.”282 Her solution to these dual,
related problems is to allow attorneys handling direct appeals to raise
ineffective assistance claims and to ease up on rules barring such
attorneys from looking outside the trial record to support such
claims.283 Primus’s relocation proposal is particularly intriguing for
misdemeanor representation,284 and such relocation would surely
benefit the anemic jurisprudence of ineffective assistance in
misdemeanor cases.
In another recent structural proposal, Professors Nancy King and
Joseph Hoffman call for “a solution that would allow the states to shift
dollars that they now waste at the back end forward to trial and appeal
at the front end, where those resources can make the kind of
meaningful difference for the accused that Strickland and postconviction review never could.”285 This re-allocation of resources
might, like Primus’s relocation proposal, advance ineffective assistance
jurisprudence in misdemeanor cases. King and Hoffman propose a
quid pro quo under which a state that “takes specified steps to
effectively reform its system of defense representation at the trial and
appellate level” would get the benefit of “scaled back” federal habeas
review as well as federal funds for providing adequate front-end
representation. In addition to this carrot, King and Hoffman propose
the stick of expanded federal habeas review in jurisdictions that fail to
undertake such “front-end reforms.”286 Although it is not clear that
King and Hoffman would include non-felonies in their proposal due to
financial constraints,287 such incentives for front-end reforms, and
282
Id. at 682; see also id. at 679 n.d1 (noting that Primus was public appellate
defender in Maryland).
283
Id. at 682.
284
Id. at 694-95 (noting “the grim reality is that the performance of trial counsel in
almost all misdemeanor and many felony cases is largely unchecked,” and that
ineffectiveness caused by the failure to provide adequate defender resources “appears
to be at its zenith for precisely those defendants who are least likely to pursue
ineffective assistance of counsel claims”).
285
Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for
the Twenty-First Century, 78 Miss. L.J. 433, 441 (2008). For a more comprehensive
exploration of this proposal, see Hoffman & King, supra note 269.
286
Id. at 442.
287
See id. at 447 (stating that “[a] third revenue source may be needed because the
cost of providing adequate counsel to all of those facing felony charges probably
dwarfs, in most states, the present cost of post-conviction review for those locked up
long enough to seek it” (emphasis added)).
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penalties for lack of reforms, would be particularly significant in the
arena of misdemeanor representation.
A critical component of front-end reform to indigent defense is the
willingness of those involved in ineffective assistance, including
defenders, prosecutors, and judges, to act. Defenders in a number of
jurisdictions, including Miami-Dade County, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, Maryland, Arizona, and Tennessee, have cited their
professional and constitutional duty to provide effective assistance in
turning down assignments to handle more cases or suing to reduce
excessive caseloads.288 These defender offices acted despite the
difficulties for defense lawyers in turning away clients in need, and in
challenging the very system within which they work. However,
“[w]ith public defender workloads growing while funding is being
reduced, more offices may soon follow their lead.”289 Judges have an
important role to play in these situations, both in dealing with the
defenders in their courtrooms who refuse to accept further cases, and
in analyzing the issues in jurisdictions where the crisis has led to
individual or class action lawsuits challenging the validity of the
indigent defender system.290 In addition, prosecutors often witness offthe-record ineffective assistance in dealing with defense counsel
during negotiations or many of the other points of contact outside the
courtroom where the parties might discuss a client’s case (such as
during the discovery process).291 Although the potential for adversarial
288
See, e.g., State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479 (Fla. App. 2010) (certifying public
defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising from excessive caseloads to Florida
Supreme Court); Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise of Equal Justice, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2009 (listing other jurisdictions), available at
http://sfpublicdefender.org/media/2009/04/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equaljustice/; see also ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2002)
(Principle One on need for independent public defense function), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf; Zeidman, supra note 71, at 6
(describing recent caseload cap initiative in New York State).
289
Adachi, supra note 288.
290
See Drinan, supra note 176, at 439-43 (discussing such systemic challenges);
see also AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 2-3 (2009) (“The
system involves too many players to hold one accountable for the routine injustice
happening in courtrooms across America.”)
291
See, e.g., Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 222 n.124 (1988) (stating that “prosecutors are
uniquely positioned to observe incompetent and lazy representation of defendants”);
Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth
Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
997, 1005-17 (2000) (describing prosecutor’s real-life experience when she witnessed
ineffective representation of defendant).
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advantage may be tempting, rules of professional responsibility and
constitutional constraints bind prosecutors where they have
knowledge of inadequate assistance of counsel.292 Prosecutorial
identification of ineffective assistance at the trial level, which would
help enable judges to act immediately, offers another avenue for frontend reform and thus helps avoid the significant obstacles to post–
conviction litigation of ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases.
Finally, in what would perhaps be the most simple, effective, and
cheapest way to move review of inadequate counsel to the front end of
the criminal justice process, judges should follow the example of the
trial court judge who stated: “If a defendant appearing in my
courtroom is not being provided with the effective assistance of
counsel, then I am obligated to intervene and protect that defendant’s
rights.”293 Unfortunately, many judges witness ineffective assistance at
the misdemeanor trial level on a regular basis. Judges might confront
the same issues of lack of independence that plague many defender
offices. However, trial courts could have great impact on the front end
of delivery of defense services by being proactive when ineffective
assistance unfolds in front of them and fulfilling their responsibility to
identify and ameliorate constitutional violations.294 The deference to
strategic decision-making that the Supreme Court requires in its
ineffective assistance jurisprudence does not extend to the trial judge,
who has the right and responsibility to ask about quality of
representation.295 This may take a few extra minutes for each case, but
292

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2002) (“[L]awyer who
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority.”).
293
COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK add. (2006) (Additional Commentary of Hon.
Patricia D. Marks), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf.
294
See generally Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and DC: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988)
(discussing various techniques that trial judges might use to evaluate defense
counsel’s degree of pretrial preparation, including pretrial conferences and use of a
pretrial worksheet for core defense tasks, in part to create a record for any post-plea
ineffective assistance claims).
295
See Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary
System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV.
945, 951 (“This article argues that trial court judges must step into the breach and
restore the integrity and fairness of the adversary system and, ultimately, the
legitimacy of criminal convictions. The trial judge’s role in safeguarding the rights of
the accused and the interests of the public is not simply a professional duty, but an
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performing such inquiries on the record could encourage better
representation, help define acceptable levels of practice, and save
resources by uncovering ineffectiveness at the front end.
2.

The Problem of Resource Deprivation Driving Constitutional
Rules

In ineffective assistance cases that explore the attorney competence
prong of Strickland, the dominant principle is that lack of diligence is
a violation whereas simple bad judgment by defense counsel is
deemed “strategic decision-making.”296 This creates real cause for
concern in misdemeanor cases, where there is often no diligence at all.
Can it ever be reasonable strategy for defense counsel to meet a client
for the first time in court, spend a few minutes discussing a plea
bargain with him while everyone waits impatiently, and then stand
next to him as he enters a “negotiated” guilty plea?297 The stark
situation begs the question: can triage that is necessary under the
current criminal justice system be part of the ineffective assistance
inquiry, thus dragging standards down to the unacceptable levels that
under-resourcing creates?298

ethical obligation. Trial judges are uniquely situated to identify substandard defense
representation.”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial
Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 73, 121-22 (2009).
296
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[A] court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”).
297
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 144 (1986) (contending that “hurried conference” with
the defendant and a near universal loss of pretrial discovery in misdemeanor cases
make it impossible to view a plea bargain as a “plausible compromise by fullyinformed decision makers”); see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 16
(describing “meet them and plead them” method of representation in various states);
RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15-22 (describing Michigan situation); Zeidman,
supra note 26, at 336-43 (describing New York City criminal courts).
298
See Brown, supra note 27, at 821 n.78 (2004) (discussing how allocation of
public defender resources is analogous to triage); Mitchell, supra note 26, at 1239-48
(discussing how realities of lower court system require public defenders to engage in
“the practice of triage”); see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 7-8, 17-18
(discussing realities of overburdened defense counsel straddled with excessive
caseloads); Jane Fritsch & Matthew Purdy, Defenders by Default: A Special Report:
Option to Legal Aid for Poor Leaves New Yorkers at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at
A1 (detailing problems with New York’s “assigned counsel” system for some indigent
defendants).
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Dissenting in Strickland, Justice Marshall raised critical questions
about implementing the two-prong test announced in that case. Justice
Marshall observed that the majority failed to clarify whether the
reasonableness of attorney performance should be judged in relation
to norms of “adequately paid retained lawyer[s]” or overburdened
appointed counsel.299 This point is particularly potent in the context of
misdemeanor cases. Courts assessing the effectiveness of a
misdemeanor attorney must decide whether to judge that performance
as reasonable under the particular circumstances present in that
jurisdiction, which might include high workloads and few resources,
or instead as reasonable where defense counsel is adequately
resourced.
Although not in the misdemeanor context, a number of courts have
touched on this resource issue in the wake of Strickland and have
taken counsel’s time limitations as well as office resources into
account in deciding what qualifies as effective assistance. For example,
the Fourth Circuit noted how “the reasonableness of an
investigation . . . must be considered in light of the scarcity of
counsel’s time and resources in preparing for a sentencing
hearing. . . .”300 In another decision, granting an ineffective assistance
claim for failure to pursue a viable affirmative defense, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized that “in this case, counsel’s deficient performance
did not . . . involve a difficult choice on how to allocate precious legal
resources.”301 This implies that resource allocation could be part of an
ineffective assistance analysis, and the court’s choice of words suggests
that such an analysis might excuse or give more leeway to decisions
made in the face of limited resources.
In Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court stated that “[c]ounsel
was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and
to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and
strategies.”302 However, both Harrington and the Circuit Court of
Appeals decisions based their holdings of failure to show ineffective
299

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 188 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 893
(2002); see also Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 387 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that
whether decision not to conduct particular investigation was reasonable “reflects the
reality that lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of endless time, energy or financial
resources”).
301
United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Mahaffey
v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted) (articulating need to
“consider the limited time and resources that defense lawyers have in preparing for a
sentencing hearing”), vacated in part on other grounds, 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998).
302
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011).
300
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assistance largely on findings that defense counsel had sound strategic
reasons to avoid the particular line of investigation.303 Thus, courts
have generally avoided grappling directly with issues of resource
deprivation.
Taking caseloads and resources into account would be particularly
problematic with misdemeanors, where clients often get the short end
of the limited-resources stick. The reality of the lower courts calls into
question the firmly entrenched deference to attorneys’ strategic
decision-making in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, at least insofar as
strategy is analyzed as going beyond the one case under review. The
circuit court decisions noted above clearly contemplated strategy to
include the need to make hard resource decisions based on caseloads
and funds; strategy was not specific to the case but rather to the
attorney, the defender office, or the jurisdiction. Such an approach
makes it constitutionally permissible to shortchange one client if such
action is intended to benefit another client. For misdemeanor
defendants, low on any resource-deprived attorney’s or office’s list,
everyone else comes first. While one might argue that the Supreme
Court’s ineffective assistance jurisprudence is concerned with strategy
within the particular case, the Court has never explicitly endorsed
such an approach and, thus, has never dealt with Justice Marshall’s
legitimate concerns about resource limits.
To bring the resource issue to its most troubling conclusion, if
strategy is not case specific, then a state or county legislature may
purposely underfund lower-level cases, or even statutorily mandate
that fewer resources go to such cases. Is it principled to allow
inadequate representation where the legislature has so underfunded
criminal defense that high caseloads and low resources are inevitable?
Surely, having this built into the jurisprudence of effective assistance
is a perverse incentive in an already besieged area.
3.

The “Localism” Problem in Ineffective Assistance Jurisprudence

Courts consider three sources in analyzing an ineffective assistance
claim: prevailing professional standards, norms of local practice, and
precedent.304 With the second factor, norms of practice in the
303
In McWee, for example, counsel did not fully explore their client’s family mental
health history, but counsel had also decided on a sentencing case theory that
“primarily focused on McWee’s positive attributes and the basically good life that he
led before he met George Wade Scott, his accomplice.” McWee, 283 F.3d at 189. The
Court noted that a focus on the myriad mental health problems in Harrington’s family
could well have undermined the chosen sentencing theory. Id.
304
See supra text accompanying note 250.
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particular jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has directed courts to
consider both “where” the case on review occurred and “when” the
case was litigated in determining if a particular lawyer rose to the
expected level of competence.305 Thus, in Wiggins v. Smith, the
Supreme Court looked at Maryland practice at the time of the
mitigation phase of Wiggins’ death penalty trial as part of the equation
for determining whether Wiggins’s attorneys provided ineffective
assistance.306 Although the result in Wiggins was that counsel had to
rise to the level of local practice to meet the constitutional floor for
effective assistance, this will not always be the case. Rather, poor
representation might be excused as the local norm. For example, a
defendant in Maryland would enjoy better representation than a
defendant in Alabama if there were more resources — and thus a
higher standard — in Maryland. Even within one state, under this
approach someone charged with a crime in a city could be
constitutionally entitled to a higher level of representation than
someone charged with that same crime in a rural county.
The Court has not explained why it relies in part on local norms in
assessing counsel’s competency. Certainly there are a number of
potential benefits to incorporating local practice norms into the
constitutional definition of effective assistance (referred to here as
“localism”). This section briefly considers those benefits, but explains
why they are either misguided or can be achieved in a better way.
One major argument for localism is that it allows for greater
flexibility in recognizing that different jurisdictions have different
formal rules of procedure. Local culture — both of the jurisdiction
generally and of the local courthouse — also affects how lawyers
interact with other lawyers, judges, clients, and juries. Navigation of
the local culture requires local knowledge. This local knowledge is
encapsulated in local practices and is developed through experience,
making it intuitive and thus hard to clearly articulate. The complexity
in clearly articulating necessary local knowledge makes it a difficult
topic for critique and comparison, highlighting the need for flexibility.
Localism’s flexibility recognizes the reality that criminal cases can
progress quite differently depending on the jurisdiction. These
differences may call for varying levels and types of defense counsel
305
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (“Standard practice in Maryland
capital cases at that time included the preparation of a social history report.”); Blume
& Neumann, supra note 161, at 151 (“In effect, when considering the adequacy of
trial counsel’s investigation, courts must now look to ABA standards, as well as local
practice, in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment has been satisfied.”).
306
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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involvement in a case. An example based on my own experience
defending individuals charged with misdemeanors in three very
different jurisdictions illustrates this point.307 Consider a Mr. Jones, an
indigent man charged with misdemeanor heroin possession. Mr. Jones
lives with his children in public housing; he has one prior conviction
from five years earlier for misdemeanor drug possession. Imagine that
the street stop of Mr. Jones, who was in front of the grocery store near
his house with a group of men when searched, raises legitimate Fourth
Amendment issues.
If Mr. Jones were arrested in Manhattan, he would meet his attorney
for the first time at his arraignment, when he would likely receive a
plea bargain offer from the prosecutor or an offer to plead guilty in
exchange for an agreed-upon sentence from the judge.308 Because of
the high volume of misdemeanors in Manhattan’s arraignment
courtrooms, Mr. Jones — assuming that he had only a minimal
criminal record — might be told that he could have a sentence of time
served should he plead guilty to the possession misdemeanor.
However, his defense counsel would also know that many
misdemeanors are dismissed in New York City under the state’s
speedy trial statute but normally only after a defendant has appeared
numerous times on the case.309 Thus, while Mr. Jones might have a
strong claim for suppression of the heroin (and thus dismissal of the
case), he would not get a hearing for many months, during which time
the offer to plead guilty for no additional jail time would likely be reoffered many times. If he could continue to appear in court, he might
win suppression or a speedy trial dismissal.
Four and a half hours away in Syracuse, New York, Mr. Jones would
be in quite a different situation. He might have been offered the option
of appearing in drug treatment court, where his case would be
dismissed if he completed a drug treatment program. Mr. Jones’s
lawyer would be invited, but not required (and perhaps not
encouraged), to attend Mr. Jones’s drug treatment court appearances,
307

My practice experience was as a public defender from 1996–2001 in New York
City, and then teaching a criminal defense clinic from 2005–2009 in Syracuse, New
York, and 2009 to the present in Montgomery County, Maryland. Thus, these
examples reflect local practice and culture during those time periods.
308
See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 32 n.10, 82 (2002) (“In a charge bargain, the prosecutor agrees to dismiss
some charges in return for a plea of guilty to the remaining charges,” whereas
sentence bargains entail “conversation [that] relates directly to the sentence rather
than to the crime of conviction.”).
309
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2011) (noting statutory speedy
trial periods).
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where the judge would get updates about Mr. Jones’s progress or
problems in treatment. After a first problem, such as a positive drug
test, Mr. Jones could remain in the program only if he pled guilty to
the possession charge. The court would not impose a sentence at this
point, however, and would agree to vacate his guilty plea upon
completion of the program. After the guilty plea, any suppression
advocacy would be off the table. At a later court appearance, defense
counsel might learn that Mr. Jones had failed another drug test and
that the judge was going to incarcerate him until there was a bed for
him at an in-patient program. Should Mr. Jones later fail to complete
that program, he could expect to be sentenced (remember, he pled
guilty earlier) to the maximum sentence for misdemeanor possession
in New York State — one year in jail.
Finally, Mr. Jones would have yet another experience in district
court in Montgomery County, Maryland. He would have no lawyer at
all at his initial appearance, where the “judicial officer” would either
release him or set bail.310 He would first meet his lawyer at or just
before his trial date, some thirty days later. 311 Counsel would tell Mr.
Jones that he would not qualify for the intensive drug education
program that leads to an effective dismissal of the charges because he
already had a drug conviction. He would have two choices that day.
First, he could plead guilty to the charge and hope for one of a variety
of potential sentences that would not involve jail time. Because district
court judges will not promise any sentences before the plea, counsel
would have to tell Mr. Jones that the judge could give him any
sentence up to the statutory maximum of four years for misdemeanor
possession. Of course counsel would also tell Mr. Jones what sentence
he thought was likely. Second, he could try to win suppression in the
lower criminal court. His lawyer would tell him that the suppression
hearing would take place that day, in the middle of a bench trial, when
the prosecution attempted to admit the heroin into evidence. Mr.
Jones would also learn that, if he did not get suppression during the
trial and was then convicted of possession, under Maryland’s de novo
system for misdemeanors he could appeal his case to the Circuit Court

310
MD. RULES § 4-213 (West 2004). But See Richmond v. Maryland, No. 24-C-06009911, 2007 WL 5446238 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2010), cert granted sub nom.
DeWolfe v. Richmond, 429 Md. 81 (Md. 2011).
311
This fast-track trial scheduling is based on my personal experience supervising
clinic students in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. There is no
Maryland statute that requires this particular process.
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to get another suppression hearing and a jury trial.312 He might also
receive a plea bargain in that court.
The descriptions of these three different courts show how taking
local practice into account in setting constitutional norms allows for
flexibility. But they also illustrate how the chaos of the particular
system may dictate a local culture of passivity instead of zealousness.
There are thus two ways to view these three different descriptions of
Mr. Jones’s case. The first view argues that these three descriptions
illustrate that local rules, practice, and culture lead to three quite
different situations, all of which require different approaches to
advocacy and some different skill sets. The need to quickly interview a
client and witnesses, and then litigate a suppression hearing, trial, and
possible sentencing in a few short hours is quite different from the
need to intensively counsel a client about the pros and cons of drug
treatment court, including the likelihood of winning the suppression
issue that the client would have to forgo to enter drug court. These
needs, in turn, are both different from the task of counseling a client
under time pressure at an arraignment about a plea offer, and to
explain the workings of a non-intuitive justice system where cases are
on the court calendar for a year or longer, only to end in dismissal for
a speedy trial violation. This first view thus embraces localism in
setting effective assistance standards.
This Article advances a second view: when resource deprivation
determines culture, ineffective assistance jurisprudence should not
excuse inadequate representation in the name of localism. For
example, lawyers struggling to adequately counsel clients facing plea
decisions at a first appearance should not be excused as a necessary
facet of practice in a locality that relies heavily on plea bargaining and
guilty pleas at the first appearance. Similarly, the specter of lawyers
attempting to meet the client for the first time, and to prepare for and
possibly go to trial in several cases on the same day cannot be
acceptable under a theory of localism that would be consistent with
the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
This second view is not entirely at odds with the first view.
Legitimate differences in local practice that arise from valid decisions
about how to administer a lower court should be taken into account in
ineffective assistance jurisprudence. For example, a number of states
have made the valid choice to use a de novo system in the lower
courts,313 as described above in the Maryland example of Mr. Jones’s
312

MD. RULES §§ 7-101, 7-102(a) (West 2004) (noting how appeals from lower
courts to circuit court “shall be tried de novo in all . . . criminal actions”).
313
See David Harris, Justice Rationed in the Pursuit of Efficiency: De Novo Trials in
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case. Other states use one system for both misdemeanors and felonies,
so that the right to appeal a conviction takes the traditional route of
direct review rather than a new hearing and trial in the court of higher
jurisdiction.314 Evaluation of the reasonableness of defense counsel’s
actions in a case litigated in a de novo system might differ from actions
taken in a traditional appellate system.
While a particular case might unfold in very different ways in
different places, there is clearly much that defense advocacy has in
common wherever it is undertaken. Thus, a clear articulation of the
common tasks expected of misdemeanor lawyers — at least at a
general level — would set a baseline consistent with reasonably
adequate lawyering expected in all cases. All of the hypothetical
lawyers representing Mr. Jones should interview him, and then
investigate the case, which might include a visit to the scene of the
search and seizure, review of applicable Fourth Amendment law, and
inspection of the evidence. Any of the three lawyers would also
counsel Mr. Jones about the viability of the suppression motion as well
as any serious collateral consequences of a drug conviction, which
would include the likelihood of both his children and him losing their
public housing. These are just a few of the many basic, common tasks
essential to the misdemeanor representation of Mr. Jones, regardless of
the place of arrest.
Justice Marshall’s insightful Strickland dissent raised a further
critical issue: “It is also a fact that the quality of representation
available to ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies
significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated by the
Sixth Amendment vary by locale?”315 Again, this discrepancy is
particularly troubling when asked in the context of misdemeanor
representation. Can the norms of practice control when they range
from outright violation of the right to counsel (pleas taken or even
trial conducted with no lawyer appointed), to “a live body next to
you” representation, to excellent work in particular jurisdictions on
minor cases? Certainly quick pleas with little consultation and littleto-no review of the evidence are common practice.316
the Criminal Courts, 24 CONN. L. REV. 381, 385 (1992) (finding that “[t]wenty-four
state utilize de novo systems”).
314
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.10 (McKinney 2005) (governing appeals).
315
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970)) (noting required
performance level is “customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the
time and place”).
316
See sources cited supra notes 133-34 (noting such problems in variety of
jurisdictions).
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To put the locality issue into stark light, imagine a county defender
office strapped for resources that decides to institute a practice of no
investigation in misdemeanor cases so that the office can devote its
entire investigatory budget to felonies. Because one of the three
sources for determining levels of ineffective assistance is local norms,
one must ask how a court reviewing a claim in this jurisdiction would
factor in this unfortunate practice. This norm of practice arises not out
of a principled determination about what level of service is necessary
to ensure just outcomes, but rather comes from the inevitable
abdication of defense responsibility in the face of insurmountable
resource deprivation combined with overwhelming caseloads.317 Such
a practice would certainly violate professional standards, including the
ABA Standard that calls for thorough investigation.318 How will a court
reconcile this conflict between local practice and national professional
standards?319 Clearly, there will always be unequal levels of indigent
representation because some defender systems offer more than the
constitutional minimum in terms of the services they provide. The
issue here is whether the constitutional minimum — the floor of
competent performance below which defense counsel cannot perform
— should differ based on where a particular person is charged.
A recent report entitled Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible
Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts called for caseloads that
are judged by the “unique nature of the jurisdiction and its
misdemeanor practice and, under no circumstances, exceed national
standards.”320 Under this approach, local calibration would come at
317
A broader critique would be that courts rely on any norms of practice in setting
effective assistance standards in any type of case. In the world of indigent defense,
which comprises the vast majority of criminal cases, most defenders’ practice is often
not — and never exclusively — driven by careful determination of what is sufficient
and what may be unnecessary. While some defender offices offer high-quality services,
other jurisdictions lack any defender office and use assigned counsel plan or “lowest
bidder” contracts to deliver indigent defense services. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE,
supra note 18, at 2 (describing three different types of defender systems: public
defender, assigned counsel, and contract). In all locations, fiscal and personnel
constraints drive the norms to some extent.
318
ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 192.
319
This example of forgoing all investigation is a stark one. It may be
unconstitutional, as Williams and Wiggins highlight the Sixth Amendment right to an
attorney who investigates the case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). However, both of those cases involved
capital sentencing mitigation investigations, a far cry from forgoing investigation in a
misdemeanor. In addition, since the right to an attorney who undertakes effective
investigation is based in part upon local practice, it circles back to the original
question.
320
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 24 (Recommendation One, on
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the front end in determining what goes into the equation. Thus, the
determination of the number of cases an attorney in one jurisdiction
can handle might differ from the number in another jurisdiction with
a different practice. The local calibration should not come at the back
end, in determining if there was indeed adequate assistance in
appellate review of a post–conviction ineffective assistance claim.
Assistance of counsel should always come out effective, and what one
jurisdiction needs to accomplish such an outcome may vary from
another.
The current incorporation of localism into ineffective assistance
jurisprudence advances a race to the bottom, with the troubling
phenomenon of courts excusing low practice levels simply because
there are low practice levels in that locale. For misdemeanor
representation, already beset with issues of resource deprivation and
other systemic pressures, courts considering post–conviction
ineffective assistance claims should reject these invalid aspects of
localism and instead should judge attorney competency against
uniform standards. There comes a point where efficiency and
inadequate funding push too hard against individual rights.
Individuals facing misdemeanor charges and potential jail time have a
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and
there is no “resource deprivation” or “triage” exception to this
important constitutional guarantee.
There are a number of structural impediments to the development
of a jurisprudence of ineffective assistance of counsel in misdemeanor
cases.321 However, courts should strive to overcome barriers wherever
possible in order to add their institutional voice to the conversation
about misdemeanor representation, and to prompt often-reluctant
legislatures to live up the realities of the misdemeanor-driven criminal
justice system that they have created. By rejecting localism in
ineffective assistance of counsel analyses, courts can urge professional
organizations to either adopt uniform misdemeanor-specific standards,
or to clarify whether current standards apply to misdemeanors and
explain how they might apply to misdemeanor advocacy. In this way,
courts can act as provocateurs: pushing the other relevant institutions
— including legislative bodies, prosecutors, and defender offices — to
fashion workable solutions to the difficult task of defining and
supporting effective misdemeanor representation.
Due to the cost of indigent defense, a strong judicial message about
the need for reforming an unconstitutional system of defense delivery
excessive caseload).
321
See supra Part III.A.1.a.
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might prompt further efforts to move unnecessary cases out of the
lower criminal courts. Indeed, a number of factors make this a critical
time for the judiciary to add its voice to the crisis in misdemeanor
representation, including: legislatures’ current willingness to engage in
decriminalization; the nationwide financial crisis that is putting
significant pressure on state, county, and local budgets;322 a growing
awareness of the difficulties that individuals with criminal records,
however minor, have in joining or rejoining the workforce; and the
implications of these barriers for public safety.323
C. The Role of Professional Organizations: Promulgating Standards for
Misdemeanor Representation
Professional organizations’ written standards for criminal justice
actors play a powerful role in reform efforts. For example, the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards are developed and promulgated by broadly
representative task forces of criminal justice practitioners that include
prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, academics, the public, and other
groups that may have a special interest in the subject.324 The resulting
standards build on the diversity of experience of these groups and
reflect many salutary practices. One commentator noted how
“[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys have found the Standards
useful . . . in guiding their own conduct, and in training and
mentoring colleagues.”325 In addition, as explored in Part II.B.2 above,
the Supreme Court has cited ABA Standards in numerous cases
analyzing prevailing professional norms under Strickland’s first prong,
and recently cited a variety of other standards as well.326
322
See Adam Skaggs & Maria da Silva, America’s Judiciary: Courting Disaster, L.A.
TIMES (July 8, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/08/opinion/la-oeskaggs-dasilva-courts-20110708; see also DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS,
supra note 69.
323
See supra notes 40, 51, 101 and accompanying text.
324
See Marcus, supra note 195, at 3.
325
Id. at 3; see also Drinan, supra note 176, at 457 (“These [ABA Criminal Justice]
standards are beneficial to litigants because they allow plaintiffs’ counsel to measure
the system’s shortcomings against an objective predetermined index of factors, and
because they assist courts and legislative bodies in crafting appropriate remedies.”);
Love, supra note 194, at 7 (“The two most respected sources of criminal defense
lawyers’ professional duty to the client are the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice . . . . Over the years, the
Standards have earned their place as a measure of ‘prevailing professional norms’ for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment through the thoroughness and balance of the
process by which they are developed.”).
326
See supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing citation to broad group
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There are currently no misdemeanor-specific professional standards
from a national organization such as the ABA.327 However, there are a
number of public defender offices that have developed high-level
practices in the lower courts,328 providing field development of
salutary, specialized misdemeanor representation that awaits
incorporation into existing sets of professional standards. At a time
when misdemeanor representation matters more than ever,329 yet the
low quality of such representation is well documented,330 it is critical
that professional organizations act. Organizations that promulgate
national standards should either set out separate misdemeanor
standards or should clarify that existing standards apply to both
misdemeanors and felonies. However, if these organizations choose
the latter route, they must provide commentary explaining what is
different about misdemeanor representation that would allow
misdemeanor defenders to handle — if national caseload
recommendations are adhered to — between double and triple the
number of cases as felony defenders.331
In 1996, the Department of Justice-funded National Advisory
Committee on Indigent Defense Services issued a report noting:
[T]he ever changing landscape in the criminal justice field,
including increasingly complex statutory schemes and
litigation, have outpaced the standards. Thus, all such national
standards, whether by the ABA, NLADA, or other national
criminal justice entities, need to be revised and updated to
meet the modern needs of institutional defenders, contract
defenders and assigned counsel in the nineties and into the
twenty-first century.332
of sources in Padilla).
327
See supra Part II.B.2. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 338-343 (describing
Washington State standards).
328
See infra text accompanying notes 346-348 (describing offices that follow a
holistic defense model); see also Legal Services, COMMUNITY LAW OFFICE,
http://www.pdknox.org/writeup/2 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (explaining that
Knoxville Public Defenders’s office handles cases in Tennessee’s misdemeanor courts).
329
See supra Part I.
330
See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12 (finding that
misdemeanor courts are depriving defendants of their right to counsel and are, at
same time, wasting tax payer money); THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1
(concluding that Florida courts, in an attempt to cope with large volumes of cases,
have failed to provide due process to individuals charged with misdemeanors).
331
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing these national caseload
recommendations).
332
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
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By suggesting that a Justice Department research branch fund and
develop defense practice standards, the Committee noted how national
standards that “promote both high quality defense services and
efficiency are crucial to the effective functioning of the criminal justice
system as a whole, and to the adjudicatory function performed by the
courts, prosecution, and defense.” The Committee pointed out how
“[s]uch standards are also a critical tool for defenders nationwide in
their ongoing battles to secure an adequate share of fiscal
resources.”333
At the time of its report, the Committee described a criminal justice
crisis fueled by the “war on drugs,” as well as harsh penalties such as
“three strikes” and mandatory sentencing laws.334 It recognized the
need to revisit existing standards in order to adjust to current realities
of the criminal justice system. Some fifteen years later, the crisis — as
well as the underlying causes that the Committee identified — still
exist. However, the exponential growth in misdemeanor prosecutions,
combined with the explosion in potential collateral consequences of
even minor criminal convictions and the wide availability of electronic
criminal records, has created another crisis, this one located in the
nation’s lower criminal courts.
By allowing for higher caseloads and different levels of experience
for misdemeanor defense counsel,335 many national and local
organizations at least implicitly recognize that the type of assistance
that individuals charged with misdemeanors require differs from the
type of assistance for more serious felony or capital cases. While the
ABA sets forth separate guidelines for capital cases, the Criminal Justice
Standards draw no such lines; all non-capital cases are lumped
together.336 The same is true in the standards of other professional
organizations, such as the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association’s Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense
Representation.337
The ABA and other professional organizations that promulgate
standards could simply clarify that their general standards apply to
representation in all types of cases, from misdemeanors carrying the
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 7 (1997), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/
Defender_Standards/Blue_Ribbon#two.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
See supra Part I.A.
336
See supra Part II.B.2. (discussing professional standards).
337
See supra note 226 and accompanying text (noting how NLADA Guidelines do
not mention the word “misdemeanor”).
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potential for little jail time to felonies carrying the potential for life in
prison. However, another option would be to differentiate, and to
specify more particularly what is expected of misdemeanor
representation. Such misdemeanor standards could come, for example,
in the form of requirements of more familiarity with and training
about the myriad collateral consequences of criminal convictions.
The full content of misdemeanor-specific standards is beyond the
scope of this Article, which instead focuses on the need for such
standards and the particular competencies of the different institutions
in articulating them. However, the Washington State Bar Association’s
Standards for Indigent Defense Services (“Washington Standards”) offer
one example of standards that differentiate misdemeanor
representation. The eighteen standards cover topics including
“Guidelines for Awarding Defense Contracts,” “Limitations on Private
Practice of Contract Attorneys,” “Caseload Limits and Types of
Cases,” and “Support Services.”338 By far the longest and most detailed
is Standard Fourteen, entitled “Qualification of Attorneys.” It seeks to
define the minimum professional qualifications necessary for an
attorney to fulfill the mandate of delivering effective assistance of
counsel.
The first part of “Qualification of Attorneys” covers minimum
qualifications for all defense counsel, while the second part sets out
“[t]rial attorneys’ qualifications according to severity or type of
case.”339 Misdemeanors are one category under this “severity or type of
case” breakdown. The qualification standard for misdemeanors simply
refers back to the first part of the standard, covering minimum
qualifications. In other words, the Washington Standards are clear that
misdemeanors require less experience than other types of
representation. However, the minimum qualifications that apply to
misdemeanor representation cover some important ground. The most
basic qualifications reference the need to meet state Supreme Court
requirements for practicing law, to be familiar with statutes, case law
and other sources “relevant to their practice area,” and to complete
seven hours of continuing legal education relating to public defense
practice each year.340 The Washington Standards also call for
familiarity “with mental health issues and [the ability] to identify the
338
See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES at
Standards 3, 7, 13, and 18 (adopted Sept. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.defensenet.org/about-wda/WSBA%20Indigent%20Defense%20Standards.pdf.
339
The third and fourth parts deal with appellate representation and interns,
respectively. Id. Standard 14.
340
Id. Standard 14.1(A), (B), (E).
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need to obtain expert services.”341 For anyone with practice experience
in the lower criminal courts, the importance of familiarity with such
issues — which arise with great frequency as individuals with mental
health issues cycle in and out of the criminal justice system — is clear.
Finally, the “Qualification of Attorneys” standards for misdemeanor
representation require familiarity “with the collateral consequences of
a conviction, including possible immigration consequences and the
possibility of civil commitment proceedings based on a criminal
conviction.”342 As noted in this Article, misdemeanor representation
requires much more than familiarity with immigration consequences
for non-citizen clients. Although the Washington misdemeanor
qualification standards need more development, including in the area
of collateral consequences, they are an important model for specific
standards of misdemeanor representation. The misdemeanor standards
make clear the expectations for attorneys representing clients in the
lower courts. In this regard, they stand in stark contrast to other
standards that make no attempt to separate out misdemeanor
representation and rely on general standards, such as one that simply
states: “Prior to handling a criminal matter, counsel should have
sufficient experience or training to provide quality representation.”343
The existence of such particularized standards demonstrates
recognition of the need for separate rules, as well as the motivation to
add them to the existing set. Standards relating to a particular area of
criminal practice, such as misdemeanors, offer an important
comparative data point for review of ineffective assistance claims, as
well as a benchmark for appropriate defense representation.
Professional standards specific to misdemeanor representation also
give courts something other than local practice — which is often so
poor as to drag norms to unconscionable levels344 — against which to
judge a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
D. The Role of the Defender Community
When committed and innovative defender offices set high
expectations for their attorneys, the resulting salutary practices can
influence other offices, national practice standards, and ineffective
assistance jurisprudence. Defender standards grow out of best

341
342
343
344

Id. Standard 14.1(D).
Id. Standard 14.1(C).
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 192, at GUIDELINE 1.2b.
See supra Part III.A.2.

2011]

Why Misdemeanors Matter

361

defender practices,345 and thus the defender community plays an early
and unique role in the development of a body of sources that might
guide misdemeanor representation. Examples of such defender
community leadership include the Neighborhood Defender Service of
Harlem and the Bronx Defenders. Both are community-based offices
that follow a holistic model of criminal defense.346 This approach,
which has been influential on a number of levels, treats clients as
individuals with a variety of potential issues in need of services rather
than simply as one narrow criminal case. One goal of the holistic
approach is to address underlying causes of involvement in the
criminal justice system in order to avoid further involvement,
including consideration of the collateral consequences of any criminal
conviction as an integral part of defender practice.347 Integrating
collateral consequences into defender practice has become a model for
other offices,348 and it is also making its way into national standards.349
A more holistic approach truly entered the national discussion about
the role of defenders in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Padilla, which held that defense counsel has a duty to warn

345

See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE OFFICE OF
PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA (SAN JOSE), at xi app.A
(2003) (“[T]here are many innovative policies and programs that have been
established in indigent defense systems across the country that are nationally regarded
as necessary ‘best practices’ to ensure high quality services to those of insufficient
means.”).
346
See THE BRONX DEFENDERS, CTR. FOR HOLISTIC DEF., THE 2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE
FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT 2-4 (2011) [hereinafter
2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE], available at http://www.bronxdefenders.org/sites/default/
files/2011%20Technical%20Assistance%20RFP.pdf (explaining Bronx Defenders’
theory of holistic representation); NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDER SERVICE OF HARLEM,
http://www.ndsny.org/index.html (last visited July 15, 2011) (noting how through a
holistic approach NDS of Harlem seeks to address underlying issues, minimize future
incidents, and provide referral services to problems arising out of collateral
consequences); see also Holistic Representation, KNOX COUNTY PUB. DEFENDERS
COMMUNITY L. OFF., http://www.pdknox.org/writeup/80 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011)
(explaining Knox County Public Defenders’s holistic representation model).
347
See 2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE, supra note 346, at 2.
348
See, e.g., MD OFF. OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.opd.state.md.us/
services.html (last visited July 15, 2011) (describing office and services provided); see
also SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 29-32 (section entitled “Doing it Better:
Holistic and Community-Based Approaches”).
349
UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, supra note 68, at 12-14;
PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 67, § 14-3.2(f) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel
should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any
plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the
contemplated plea.”).
THE
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clients about the deportation consequences of a conviction.350 The
influence of this approach is also apparent in the numerous lower
court decisions following Padilla, many of which have extended the
duty to warn to collateral consequences other than deportation.351
Although some offices have written practice standards,352 many lack
clear guidelines.353 Memorializing these practices in written local
defender office standards has the benefit of providing clear guidance
and benchmarks against which to evaluate attorney competency. In
addition, these standards would come from service providers with the
expertise to understand and articulate best practices.
Although voluntary adoption of best practices by defender offices
benefits clients and advances defense practice norms, the lack of an
enforcement mechanism for such standards can weaken their effect.
One recent report on the state of indigent defense noted how,
although almost all national and local practice standards are
voluntary,
[A]n indigent defense program could choose to require that its
attorneys adhere to them. For example, certain of the
recommendations contained in NLADA’s Performance
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation could be
made mandatory for an agency’s attorneys, and sanctions
could be imposed in instances of non-compliance. However,
we are aware of no defense program that has actually
developed a vigorous process to monitor and strictly enforce
compliance with performance standards.354
The report describes how “at least one state has adopted standards that
purport to be mandatory as a condition for receiving funding from the
state,” referring to the Indiana Public Defender Commission’s
350
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); see also Conference Report,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function
(June 20-21, 2011), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=
ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10396&contentid=20736&folderid=360
(describing event to “bring together people with a variety of experiences in the
criminal justice system to discuss the future of the role of the defense lawyer”).
351
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2010) (extending
Padilla to sex offender registration); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2010), cert. granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010) (holding that counsel must
warn of possible loss of pension as a consequence to entering plea).
352
See COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND COMPLAINT
PROCEDURES (2010), available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_
manual/chapter_four.html.
353
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 41.
354
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 72, at 35.
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Standards for Indigent Defense Services in Non-Capital Cases.355 Of
course, as described in Part II.B.2 above, such standards do not
specifically address misdemeanor practice.356
While a full exploration of the myriad ways in which the defender
community might set and enforce standards for misdemeanor practice
is beyond the scope of this Article, the remainder of this section briefly
describes two areas in need of immediate attention for training, policy,
and standards: first, the understanding and use of collateral
consequences for interviewing and counseling clients, and negotiating
plea bargains with the State; and second, the alarming rate of waiver of
the right to counsel in many lower courts around the nation.
1.

Collateral Consequences as a Focus of Misdemeanor Attorney
Training and Practice

In 2002, the ABA published the Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System in recognition of “the need for clear and concise
guidance on how to design an effective system for providing public
defense services.”357 Principle Number Six calls for a system where
“[d]efense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the
complexity of the case.”358 The ABA intended this Principle to capture
the idea that there are certain classes of cases that require a certain
level of experience and expertise. For example, the commentary for
this Principle cites the “Attorney Eligibility” guideline from the ABA’s
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases.359 Few would argue with the notion that defense
counsel needs experience before handling cases that carry significant
potential prison — or death — sentences, or with the idea that
attorneys need particularized training to handle these cases, such as in
the area of forensic evidence or capital mitigation advocacy.
Misdemeanor lawyering also calls for particularized training and
ability. In a system of generally low-stakes criminal sanctions for
misdemeanor convictions,360 defense counsel must have training and
355
Id. at 34 & n.76 (citing IND. PUB. DEFENDER COMM’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES IN NON-CAPITAL CASES (1995), available at http://www.in.gov/
judiciary/pdc/docs/standards/non-cap.pdf.).
356
The Indiana Standards set minimum qualifications for attorneys handling
felonies, but only mention minimum qualifications for misdemeanor cases in the
juvenile delinquency context. Id. at 9.
357
See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 288, at iv.
358
Id. at 1.
359
Id. at 5 & n.21.
360
But see supra notes 55-61 (describing jurisdictions such as Maryland, with 10-
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expertise in the non-criminal sanctions that often overwhelm any
sentence that the trial judge imposes.361 As the Director of Bronx
Defenders noted, “[W]hen a plea to disorderly conduct makes a client
presumptively ineligible for New York City public housing, as it does
here, or where two convictions for turnstile jumping makes a lawful,
permanent resident non-citizen deportable, then something has got to
change and indigent defense needs to look different.”362 This
observation captures the concept of focusing defender resources on
issues that matter most to the client. In the case of misdemeanors with
low-level sanctions, severe collateral consequences of any conviction
will surely play a large role in a defendant’s cost-benefit analysis of
entering a guilty plea or going to trial.363
Training for attorneys just entering defense work (and thus most
likely to handle misdemeanor cases), or for attorneys who practice
exclusively in the lower criminal courts, should focus on the most
pervasive and common collateral consequences of criminal
convictions.364 To be sure, there is some positive movement in this
direction. However, it is still quite limited. For example, Wisconsin’s
Office of the State Public Defender offers a variety of continuing legal
education trainings, one of which is entitled Handling a Misdemeanor
Case from A to Z.365 In 2009, the A to Z agenda did not list any topic
relating to collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction.366
The 2010 training agenda had one hour on “Immigration
Consequences of Conviction,”367 presumably included as a result of
the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision.368 Although it is certainly an
improvement that at least one collateral consequence has found its

year maximum sentences for some misdemeanors and California, where certain crimes
“wobble” between misdemeanor and felony).
361
See supra Part I.B (discussing the collateral consequences of misdemeanor
convictions).
362
Spangenberg Study, supra note 129, at 145.
363
See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing such analyses by
defendants).
364
Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 90, at 498.
365
See Year 2010, CLE Approved Programs, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE (Jan. 13,
2011), http://training.wisspd.org/file.php/1/CLE/Complete_CLE_List_1998-2010_.pdf.
366
See Handling a Misdemeanor Case from A to Z, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
http://wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/AZ09/MilwAgenda.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
367
Handling a Misdemeanor Case from A to Z, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
http://wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/AZ10/MadAgenda.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
368
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010).
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way into these new attorney trainings,369 a one- or two-day training
cannot cover everything; misdemeanor attorneys should be aware of
more than immigration consequences for non-citizen clients. In
addition to immigration, misdemeanor attorneys should learn about
the jurisdiction’s statutory bars to employment for individuals with a
criminal record, as well as any other serious collateral consequence
that would apply if the client were convicted.370
Once armed with important information about collateral
consequences that matter to the client, misdemeanor attorneys have
the greatest potential for creative use of such information in pleabargaining with prosecutors to avoid unintended consequences in
particular cases.371 There are a number of reasons for this potential,
including the fact that in low-level cases, prosecutors may be more
flexible in working out bargains that avoid serious collateral
consequences, and that defenders often have a number of alternative
misdemeanors, noncriminal offenses, or diversion programs to choose
from in proposing solutions. As Justice Stevens noted in Padilla:
Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of
the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense
may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an
offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.
At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the
defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an
offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a
dismissal of a charge that does.372

369
Immigration consequences are also now on the general CLE training list in
Wisconsin. See Immigration and Criminal Defense in the Post-Padilla Era, WIS. ST. PUB.
DEFENDER’S OFFICE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://wispdtraining.blogspot.com/2011/02/ondemand-immigration-and-criminal.html (describing course focusing on defense
counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty to counsel non-citizen clients about immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction).
370
See supra Part I.B (discussing serious collateral consequences of misdemeanor
convictions).
371
For a more fully developed exploration of defenders’ use of collateral
consequences in negotiations, see Roberts, supra note 137, at 719-25.
372
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“By bringing deportation consequences into th[e
plea bargaining] process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach
agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”); see also Smyth, Holistic Is
Not a Bad Word, supra note 90, at 493; Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the
President, PROSECUTOR, May–June 2001, at 5 (former President of the National District
Attorneys Association writing that prosecutors “must consider [collateral
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The Padilla decision thus highlighted the importance of incorporating
collateral consequences into plea negotiations. However, standards for
and training about negotiation are not common in defender offices;
the skill of negotiation is perhaps one of the most neglected skills,
beginning in law school and continuing into practice.373
Misdemeanor attorneys should also be trained to pursue any sealing
or expungement mechanisms available for the client’s criminal
records.374 In some jurisdictions, there may be a certificate of relief
from civil disabilities or other document to ameliorate such things as
employer hesitancy in hiring individuals with criminal records.375 Such
relief mechanisms are particularly important in an era where
landlords, employers, and the general public have easy electronic
access to an individual’s criminal records, and in jurisdictions where
dismissals remain on the record until expunged.376 Although felony
convictions can rarely be sealed, many jurisdictions allow for sealing
of misdemeanor records, and misdemeanor defenders should integrate
this critical step — as well as helping the client apply for certificates of
relief — into client representation.
The defender community has an important role to play in training
new attorneys and attorneys focused on lower court practice.
Trainings aimed at collateral consequences, expungement, sealing, or
other relief mechanisms, are a critical facet of misdemeanor
representation, and deserve more attention than they currently
receive.
consequences] if we are to see that justice is done”).
373
This observation is based on my own practice experience, as well as my
experience researching law school curricular offerings as I developed a course on plea
bargaining that includes readings about and a simulation involving negotiation. Many
schools offer a general Lawyer Bargaining or Negotiation type of class, but these are
generally limited-enrollment seminars taken by small numbers of students. See, e.g.,
DAY
O’CONNOR
C.
L.,
Course
Information
Spring
2012,
SANDRA
http://apps.law.asu.edu/Apps/Registrar/CourseInfo/AllCourses.aspx?semester=20121
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (showing that there is one Negotiation course offered).
374
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 938.355 (2011) (juvenile expungement statute); WIS. STAT.
§ 973.015 (2011) (expungement of record in limited instances for adults).
375
See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 701-03 (2011); cf. Joy Radice, Administering
Justice: Removing Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 28-30, 41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1864917 (describing how under New York law, employers must use
presumption of rehabilitation when considering hiring individual presenting
certificate of rehabilitation, but how “[m]any unanswered questions exist about how
employers actually use certificates in their decision-making. If the court decisions
described above are any indication, the consideration may be minimal at best.”).
376
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s expungement
statute and electronic access to records).
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Lowering High Rates of Waiver of the Right to Counsel in the
Lower Courts

Misdemeanor-focused trainings will only benefit clients who
actually receive the assistance of counsel. Yet in lower courts across
the country, there are high rates of waiver of the right to counsel,
often under troubling circumstances. For example, under Colorado
state law, indigent defendants facing misdemeanor charges must
consult with a prosecutor before applying for appointed counsel. It is
only after the prosecutor informs the court of any plea agreement
between the state and the uncounseled defendant that the court must
advise the defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel (if
qualified).377 This troubling incentive structure is clearly constructed
to encourage waiver of the right to counsel, as the first mention of
counsel comes when an agreed-upon bargain is already on the table. A
defendant who has already accepted such a bargain and stands before
the judge ready to enter the plea is unlikely to suddenly assert his
newfound right to counsel.378
Waiver of the right to counsel is permissible only if the judge
ensures that the defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
relinquishing this constitutional right.379 Yet there are high waiver
rates and waiver practices in lower courts across the country that are,
like Colorado’s, questionable.380 For example, a recent study of
377

COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(4) (2006).
See RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15 (describing a similar incentive
structure in Michigan’s lower courts); see also Ronald E. Wright & Wayne A. Logan,
The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2045, 2087 (2006) (“Statewide court data from Minnesota and North Carolina
fail to reveal any impact on waiver rates when those states enacted application fee
statutes. This statewide pattern might show that defendants place a higher value on
defense counsel than the amount of the application fee, or it could reflect the efforts of
trial judges and defense lawyers to spare the defendants from such choices. We are
more inclined to believe the latter, because it fits with the often-observed power of
trial actors to dampen the effects of criminal justice policy changes imposed from the
top, especially in the short-run.”).
379
See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (“The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against
him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable
punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.”).
380
See Wright & Logan, supra note 378, at 2080 (comparing felony and
misdemeanor waiver rates in North Carolina and Minnesota). There is a pending
constitutional challenge to the Colorado statute. See Complaint at 1, Colo. Crim. Def.
Bar v. Ritter, No. 10-cv-2930-JLK, (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2010) (“Plaintiffs bring this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) to obtain a declaration that Colorado violates the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by deferring the appointment of
counsel for certain indigent criminal defendants until after such defendants engage in
378
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Florida’s lower courts revealed that 66% of defendants came to their
arraignment without counsel. Of those defendants, half waived the
right to counsel.381 Defendants who waived their right to counsel were
most likely to enter a guilty plea at arraignment, with more than 80%
pleading either guilty or no contest, which has the same legal effect as
a guilty plea,382 at that early appearance.383
A number of studies have highlighted the doubtful validity of the
waiver process in a variety of jurisdictions.384 In one study:
In a number of jurisdictions, site teams observed judges
ignoring the rules regarding waiver. Time after time, courts
made clear to defendants that they must waive counsel to
proceed. There were no inquiries into the education or
sophistication of the defendants and very few efforts to warn
defendants regarding the dangers of self-representation or the
kind of assistance counsel could provide. Often the waiver was
incorporated into the first part of the proceeding and was
presented as a rhetorical, compound question directed at
whether the defendant wanted to dispose of the case quickly.
The judge asked the defendant something like, “You are
waiving counsel and wish to proceed now, right?” and the
defendant responded, “Yes.”385
Even when valid, waiver of the constitutional right to counsel is
troubling because it means that a defendant is representing himself in
a proceeding that may result in a criminal record, a jail sentence, or
some other significant outcome. Despite a defendant’s satisfaction with
the outcome of his case — for example a plea bargain to a seemingly
minor misdemeanor that allows him to avoid incarceration — that
defendant will likely be unaware of the myriad collateral consequences
of that conviction.386 This may include ignorance of the fact that the
misdemeanor can be used to enhance punishment in a later
conviction. As the former Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court
discussions with prosecuting attorneys regarding potential plea offers.”).
381
THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15.
382
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining “no contest” pleas).
383
THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 23 tbl.9; see also Wright & Logan, supra
note 378, at 2080-82 (stating that, although “precious little data exist on waivers of
counsel in misdemeanor cases,” approximately 40% of misdemeanor defendants in
North Carolina waived counsel).
384
See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 39; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE
WASTE, supra note 12, at 15-16.
385
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 15.
386
See supra Part I (setting out various collateral consequences).
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noted in one example, “[S]pur-of-the-moment decisions to plead
guilty to driving on a suspended license or under the influence can be
used to charge a subsequent suspended license or DUI offense as a
felony in Florida.”387
In addition to ignorance about potential enhanced punishment
based on a misdemeanor conviction, waiver means that there is no
counsel to warn a defendant about serious collateral consequences of
his guilty plea and conviction. This raises interesting legal issues in the
wake of Padilla v. Kentucky.388 There is now a constitutional duty for
defense counsel to warn clients about the deportation consequences of
a criminal conviction, a duty that some lower courts have extended
beyond deportation to include other serious consequences such as sex
offender registration.389 The combination of high waiver rates in
misdemeanor cases, high rates of guilty pleas after waiver in some
jurisdictions, and the many serious collateral consequences that flow
from misdemeanor convictions raises the question of whether a court
must ensure that a defendant realizes he is giving up his right to
counsel about such collateral consequences through his waiver. It also
raises the question of whether a court’s inquiry about the matter is
sufficient, given the inability of the court to question a defendant
about things such as citizenship to determine what collateral
consequences might apply. Finally, lowering high rates of waiver in
the lower courts could lead to significant long-term savings, as
effective defense advocacy can result in fewer unnecessary convictions
and, therefore, fewer individuals saddled with a criminal record that
serves as a bar to most employment.390 These issues illustrate the need
for guidance and an updated view about standards surrounding waiver
in misdemeanor cases.
The defender community’s voice on the issue of high rates of waiver
in the lower courts is critical. In most jurisdictions, high workloads
mean that public defenders struggle to handle existing clients’ cases.391
A recommendation that defender offices ameliorate high waiver rates
by providing counsel at the first appearance and representing more
387

THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 7; see also Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738, 738-39 (1994) (valid uncounseled misdemeanor can be used to enhance
punishment in subsequent case). But see State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1052 (Fla.
2008) (“[T]he State may not use an uncounseled conviction to increase a defendant’s
loss of liberty in the absence of a valid waiver of counsel.”).
388
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
389
See sources supra note 187.
390
See supra note 94- 96 (discussing employment bars based on criminal history).
391
See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (describing high caseloads in
many jurisdictions).
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clients in lower court cases sounds unrealistic. However, defenders are
uniquely situated to witness inappropriate waivers and to advocate on
behalf of the individuals subject to such conditions. Defender offices
are also situated to take positions on standards for waiver in
misdemeanor cases. Although articulating salutary practice standards
may not lead to immediate change, there is certainly precedent for the
defender community advancing norms of effective assistance. The
decision in Padilla came after the development of a holistic defender
movement that took collateral consequences into account in defense
advocacy392 and the articulation of professional standards
encompassing a duty to counsel clients about deportation.393 The
Court cited these developments in setting forth the constitutional
standard.394
The defender community is the front line in defining standards for
effective misdemeanor assistance. By training lawyers to incorporate
collateral consequences into interviewing, counseling, negotiation,
and sentencing advocacy, defender offices do more than provide a
critical piece of assistance to clients facing misdemeanor charges.
These offices also influence others in the defender community, as well
as professional organizations that write defense practice standards and
courts that decide ineffective assistance claims. This same influence
could be felt in the area of waiver of the right to counsel if defender
offices received resources needed to cover more of those cases.
CONCLUSION
“Most people who go to court in the United States go to
misdemeanor courts. The volume of misdemeanor cases is
staggering.”395 Yet the view expressed in one recent report is
unfortunately representative of the quality of representation in many
of the nation’s lower courts: “the emphasis on celerity of case
processing has led many of the criminal justice stake holders . . .
interviewed in one jurisdiction . . . to colloquially refer to the district
[misdemeanor] court arraignment dockets as ‘McJustice Day.’ ”396
Misdemeanor defenders struggle with high workloads and few

392

See supra notes 346-51 and accompanying text.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citing numerous ABA
Standards and other guidelines).
394
Id. at 1482-83.
395
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 11.
396
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resources. Indeed, some defenders — and even entire offices — have
found it necessary to litigate these resources issues.397
Despite some recent recognition of the troubling quality of
representation and coercive circumstances in the lower criminal
courts, the meaning of effective misdemeanor representation remains
largely undefined. There is no developed Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence of misdemeanor ineffective assistance of counsel to
regulate attorney behavior; nor are there any professional standards
for criminal defense practice that address the particular challenges of
misdemeanor practice. The lack of standards and inadequate
representation is a serious problem because misdemeanors matter.
Even minor criminal convictions can lead to major collateral
consequences, including deportation, loss of public housing and
benefits, sex offender registration and community notification, and de
facto bars to employment. Quality representation in misdemeanor
cases can help individuals avoid unnecessary collateral consequences,
as well as unnecessarily long jail sentences and wrongful convictions.
There are also social costs to inadequate misdemeanor counsel,
including the effects that unnecessary misdemeanor convictions can
have on employment, housing, and other issues of daily living that are
critical to the quality of life for individuals, families, and entire
communities. Legislatures that underfund indigent defense should
consider the overall costs that inadequate presentation has on society.
Currently, there is an opportune climate for legislatures to take a
broad view in advancing reform in the lower criminal courts and
misdemeanor defense. The fiscal crisis, as well as a growing public
recognition that minor convictions can hinder productive
participation in society, has led to several important decriminalization
actions in various jurisdictions. By moving low-level misdemeanors
out of the criminal justice system, while refraining from funding cuts
for defenders, legislatures could fulfill the constitutional mandate for
effective assistance of counsel through smarter spending.
There should be no dispute that there is a crisis of representation in
the nation’s lower courts, driven by high volume and low resource

397

See, e.g., Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 950545629S, 1996 WL 636475 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (declining to grant motion to dismiss in class action suit on
behalf of indigent defendants alleging inadequate representation due to excessive
caseloads and insufficient resources); State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (certifying public defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising
from excessive caseloads to the Florida Supreme Court); Louisiana v. Peart, 621 So. 2d
780 (La. 1993) (finding that indigent defendants were not provided with effective
assistance of counsel due to large caseloads and lack of resources).
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levels.398 This crisis must be taken seriously, as it leads to real harm in
individual cases and threatens the very legitimacy of the criminal
justice system. Development of misdemeanor representation standards
alone will not reform a deeply troubled criminal justice system. Yet
there is little hope of cultural or constitutional change in the lower
courts, where most individuals charged with crimes experience the
system, without first defining rights and responsibilities in the
misdemeanor context. Standards for misdemeanor practice, articulated
by defenders, professional organizations, and ineffective assistance
jurisprudence, would provide a crucial baseline against which to judge
the current crisis in the lower courts. The existence of standards
would serve to highlight current inadequacies, pushing legislatures
already concerned with fiscal realities to give serious consideration to
decriminalization, better defense funding as a long-term savings
strategy, and other potential solutions to the indigent defense crisis.
Courts, professional organizations that write standards for criminal
defense practice, and the defender community are best situated to
define effective misdemeanor advocacy. Each of these institutions has
particular competencies and specific roles to play in shaping
misdemeanor standards.

398
See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14 (“the operation of
misdemeanor courts in this country is grossly inadequate and frequently unjust”);
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 29 (noting how there are “deep-rooted
problems in the delivery of indigent defense services, establishing a clear and pressing
need for reform.”).

